Social isolation enhances neuroinflammatory response to stroke.

Karelina et al. give more detail on how social isolation can alter the expression of the interleukin molecules that regulate inflammation:

Social isolation has dramatic long-term physiological and psychological consequences; however, the mechanisms by which social isolation influences disease outcome are largely unknown. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effects of social isolation on neuronal damage, neuroinflammation, and functional outcome after focal cerebral ischemia. Male mice were socially isolated (housed individually) or pair housed with an ovariectomized female before induction of stroke, via transient intraluminal middle cerebral artery occlusion (MCAO), or SHAM surgery. In these experiments, peri-ischemic social isolation decreases poststroke survival rate and exacerbates infarct size and edema development. The social influence on ischemic damage is accompanied by an altered neuroinflammatory response; specifically, central interleukin-6 (IL-6) signaling is down-regulated, whereas peripheral IL-6 is up-regulated, in isolated relative to socially housed mice. In addition, intracerebroventricular injection of an IL-6 neutralizing antibody (10 ng) eliminates social housing differences in measures of ischemic outcome. Taken together, these data suggest that central IL-6 is an important mediator of social influences on stroke outcome.

Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners

From Sachdeva et al (The first two experiments measured altruistic behavior as a donation amount pledged by participants. The third experiments used a cooperative decision-making task in an environmental context to assess whether people would show moral cleansing and licensing when they were asked to cooperate with others for the good of the environment.):

The question of why people are motivated to act altruistically has been an important one for centuries, and across various disciplines. Drawing on previous research on moral regulation, we propose a framework suggesting that moral (or immoral) behavior can result from an internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior. In a first experiment, participants were asked to write a self-relevant story containing words referring to either positive or negative traits. Participants who wrote a story referring to the positive traits donated one fifth as much as those who wrote a story referring to the negative traits. In the second experiment, we showed that this effect was due specifically to a change in the self-concept. Finally, in experiment 3, we replicated these findings and extended them to cooperative behavior in environmental decision making. We suggest that affirming a moral identity leads people to feel licensed to act immorally. However, when moral identity is threatened, moral behavior is a means to regain some lost self-worth.

Seeing is remembering

A fascinating article from Harrison and Tong on how we hold fine details in our working memory by a top down mechanism in which frontal working memory areas apparently instruct early visual areas (V1-V4) at the rear of our cortex to retain information about visual features held in working memory :

Visual working memory provides an essential link between perception and higher cognitive functions, allowing for the active maintenance of information about stimuli no longer in view. Research suggests that sustained activity in higher-order prefrontal, parietal, inferotemporal and lateral occipital areas supports visual maintenance, and may account for the limited capacity of working memory to hold up to 3–4 items. Because higher-order areas lack the visual selectivity of early sensory areas, it has remained unclear how observers can remember specific visual features, such as the precise orientation of a grating, with minimal decay in performance over delays of many seconds. One proposal is that sensory areas serve to maintain fine-tuned feature information, but early visual areas show little to no sustained activity over prolonged delays. Here we show that orientations held in working memory can be decoded from activity patterns in the human visual cortex, even when overall levels of activity are low. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and pattern classification methods, we found that activity patterns in visual areas V1–V4 could predict which of two oriented gratings was held in memory with mean accuracy levels upwards of 80%, even in participants whose activity fell to baseline levels after a prolonged delay. These orientation-selective activity patterns were sustained throughout the delay period, evident in individual visual areas, and similar to the responses evoked by unattended, task-irrelevant gratings. Our results demonstrate that early visual areas can retain specific information about visual features held in working memory, over periods of many seconds when no physical stimulus is present.

The 100 year old neuroscientist

Nature does a brief review of the life of Rita Levi-Montalcini, the first Nobel Laureate to reach their 100th birthday. It makes a fascinating read. I was just getting into neuroscience in the late 1950's when she, along with others, discovered NGF (nerve growth factor). Things were very competitive, a number of priority disputes arose, there were accusations of dishonest behavior. (My own bit of gossip from the sidelines: a colleague of mine at the time sent a letter to her describing in detail some of his recent experimental results, then told me that three verbatim paragraphs from his letter appeared in Levi-Montalcini's next paper, which claimed priority for the discoveries.) Here is a striking clip about her more recent, and laudable, efforts.

...on the morning of 18 November 2006, she had the attention of the entire Italian government. A senator for life, Levi-Montalcini held the deciding vote on a budget backed by the government of Romano Prodi, which held a parliamentary majority of just one.

A few days earlier, Levi-Montalcini had said she would withdraw her support for the budget unless the government reversed a last-minute decision to sacrifice science funds. It was Levi-Montalcini versus Prodi — and Levi-Montalcini won. On the morning of the vote, immaculately turned out as always, she walked regally on the arm of an usher to her seat in the Italian senate and cast her vote. At one stroke, she secured the budget, won a battle for Italian science and snubbed Francesco Storace, leader of the Right party and part of the opposition coalition. A few weeks earlier, Storace had caused a national scandal by announcing his intention to send crutches to Levi-Montalcini's home — symbolic of her both being a crutch to an ailing government, he said, and her age, which he considered too old to be allowed to vote.

Levi-Montalcini didn't consider herself too old then, when she was 97 years old, and she certainly doesn't now when, on 22 April, she will become the first Nobel laureate to reach the age of 100. Italy — and quite possibly the world — has never seen a scientist quite like her.

Family Tree

Check out this site. The artist has photographed father/son, mother/daughter, and even father/daughter and mother/son individually, sized and printed the photos at the same proportions, then torn and glued them together to make one portrait. (click to enlarge).

Sites for abstract versus concrete actions in frontal lobes.

By observing behavioral deficits of lesion patients Badre et al. find that there is a hierarchical organization of cognitive control, with rostral (towards top of head) areas of the frontal lobes being required for decisions about more abstract actions and lower caudal areas (towards spinal column or tail) being required for decisions about more concrete actions.

Cognitive control permits us to make decisions about abstract actions, such as whether to e-mail versus call a friend, and to select the concrete motor programs required to produce those actions, based on our goals and knowledge. The frontal lobes are necessary for cognitive control at all levels of abstraction. Recent neuroimaging data have motivated the hypothesis that the frontal lobes are organized hierarchically, such that control is supported in progressively caudal regions as decisions are made at more concrete levels of action. We found that frontal damage impaired action decisions at a level of abstraction that was dependent on lesion location (rostral lesions affected more abstract tasks, whereas caudal lesions affected more concrete tasks), in addition to impairing tasks requiring more, but not less, abstract action control. Moreover, two adjacent regions were distinguished on the basis of the level of control, consistent with previous functional magnetic resonance imaging results. These results provide direct evidence for a rostro-caudal hierarchical organization of the frontal lobes.

Neural mechanism of first impressions.

From Schiller et al:

Evaluating social others requires processing complex information. Nevertheless, we can rapidly form an opinion of an individual during an initial encounter. Moreover, people can vary in these opinions, even though the same information is provided. We investigated the brain mechanisms that give rise to the impressions that are formed on meeting a new person. Neuroimaging revealed that responses in the amygdala and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) were stronger while encoding social information that was consistent, relative to inconsistent, with subsequent evaluations. In addition, these responses scaled parametrically with the strength of evaluations. These findings provide evidence for encoding differences on the basis of subsequent evaluations, suggesting that the amygdala and PCC are important for forming first impressions.

Figure. (Click to enlarge) a - Functional regions of interest (ROIs) were identified by contrasting faces with person-descriptive sentences versus face-alone presentations. The dmPFC and left amygdala are denoted by yellow circle on the statistical activation map. b - To examine whether these ROIs show differential neural response to information that is relevant versus irrelevant to later evaluations, we extracted the BOLD response from each of these regions and compared the mean percentage BOLD signal change during the presentation of evaluation-relevant versus evaluation-irrelevant person-descriptive sentences. The differential score was calculated by subtracting evaluation-irrelevant from evaluation-relevant responses, so positive scores correspond to stronger responses to the evaluation-relevant information. A significant differential responding was shown by the PCC and the amygdala, but not by the dmPFC.

Thinking like a trader reduces your loss aversion.

Sokol-Hessnera et al (open access). note that a cognitive regulation strategy can reduce loss aversion:

Research on emotion regulation has focused upon observers' ability to regulate their emotional reaction to stimuli such as affective pictures, but many other aspects of our affective experience are also potentially amenable to intentional cognitive regulation. In the domain of decision-making, recent work has demonstrated a role for emotions in choice, although such work has generally remained agnostic about the specific role of emotion. Combining psychologically-derived cognitive strategies, physiological measurements of arousal, and an economic model of behavior, this study examined changes in choices (specifically, loss aversion) and physiological correlates of behavior as the result of an intentional cognitive regulation strategy. Participants were on average more aroused per dollar to losses relative to gains, as measured with skin conductance response, and the difference in arousal to losses versus gains correlated with behavioral loss aversion across subjects. These results suggest a specific role for arousal responses in loss aversion. Most importantly, the intentional cognitive regulation strategy, which emphasized “perspective-taking,” uniquely reduced both behavioral loss aversion and arousal to losses relative to gains, largely by influencing arousal to losses. Our results confirm previous research demonstrating loss aversion while providing new evidence characterizing individual differences and arousal correlates and illustrating the effectiveness of intentional regulation strategies in reducing loss aversion both behaviorally and physiologically.

Fetal ethanol exposure increases ethanol intake of offspring

More sobering information on how maternal patterns of drug use, can be passed on to offspring, presumably by means of epigenetic chemosensory mechanisms.

Human epidemiologic studies reveal that fetal ethanol exposure is highly predictive of adolescent ethanol avidity and abuse. Little is known about how fetal exposure produces these effects. It is hypothesized that fetal ethanol exposure results in stimulus-induced chemosensory plasticity. Here, we asked whether gestational ethanol exposure increases postnatal ethanol avidity in rats by altering its taste and odor. Experimental rats were exposed to ethanol in utero via the dam's diet, whereas control rats were either pair-fed an iso-caloric diet or given food ad libitum. We found that fetal ethanol exposure increased the taste-mediated acceptability of both ethanol and quinine hydrochloride (bitter), but not sucrose (sweet). Importantly, a significant proportion of the increased ethanol acceptability could be attributed directly to the attenuated aversion to ethanol's quinine-like taste quality. Fetal ethanol exposure also enhanced ethanol intake and the behavioral response to ethanol odor. Notably, the elevated intake of ethanol was also causally linked to the enhanced odor response. Our results demonstrate that fetal exposure specifically increases ethanol avidity by, in part, making it taste and smell better. More generally, they establish an epigenetic chemosensory mechanism by which maternal patterns of drug use can be transferred to offspring. Given that many licit (e.g., tobacco products) and illicit (e.g., marijuana) drugs have noteworthy chemosensory components, our findings have broad implications for the relationship between maternal patterns of drug use, child development, and postnatal vulnerability.

Visual neglect overcome by pleasant music

Soto et al. make the fascinating observation that positive emotions can overcome the neglect of part of the visual field that can result from brain lesions:

During the past 20 years there has been much research into the factors that modulate awareness of contralesional information in neurological patients with visual neglect or extinction. However, the potential role of the individual's emotional state in modulating awareness has been largely overlooked. In the current study, we induced a pleasant and positive affective response in patients with chronic visual neglect by allowing them to listen to their pleasant preferred music. We report that the patients showed enhanced visual awareness when tasks were performed under preferred music conditions relative to when tasks were performed either with unpreferred music or in silence. These results were also replicated when positive affect was induced before neglect was tested. Functional MRI data showed enhanced activity in the orbitofrontal cortex and the cingulate gyrus associated with emotional responses when tasks were performed with preferred music relative to unpreferred music. Improved awareness of contralesional (left) targets with preferred music was also associated with a strong functional coupling between emotional areas and attentional brain regions in spared areas of the parietal cortex and early visual areas of the right hemisphere. These findings suggest that positive affect, generated by preferred music, can decrease visual neglect by increasing attentional resources. We discuss the possible roles of arousal and mood in generating these effects.

The end of moral philosophy

Again I am amazed at how well David Brooks keeps up with contemporary psychology and brain science, picking up on the recent upsurge in research on the good stuff in human nature like our evolved affiliative emotions. Check out this Op-Ed piece.

Another Twitter parody...

I couldn't resist passing this on:

Medial prefrontal cortex exhibits money illusion

My Feb. 23 post noted work showing, yet again, that we can be lured into making decisions by numbers that seem bigger than they really are. We apparently go with numerical values rather than real economic values. Weber et al. look at brain activity at accompanies the money illusion:

Behavioral economists have proposed that money illusion, which is a deviation from rationality in which individuals engage in nominal evaluation, can explain a wide range of important economic and social phenomena. This proposition stands in sharp contrast to the standard economic assumption of rationality that requires individuals to judge the value of money only on the basis of the bundle of goods that it can buy—its real value—and not on the basis of the actual amount of currency—its nominal value. We used fMRI to investigate whether the brain's reward circuitry exhibits money illusion. Subjects received prizes in 2 different experimental conditions that were identical in real economic terms, but differed in nominal terms. Thus, in the absence of money illusion there should be no differences in activation in reward-related brain areas. In contrast, we found that areas of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which have been previously associated with the processing of anticipatory and experienced rewards, and the valuation of goods, exhibited money illusion. We also found that the amount of money illusion exhibited by the vmPFC was correlated with the amount of money illusion exhibited in the evaluation of economic transactions.

Delayed brain development in humans compared with other primates

A prevailing view is that the appearance of many human-specific features during development has been made possible by a slowing down of the process, particularly in the brain (developmental retardation, or neoteny). Somel et al. prove the point by looking at gene expression in humans and other primates during development:

In development, timing is of the utmost importance, and the timing of developmental processes often changes as organisms evolve. In human evolution, developmental retardation, or neoteny, has been proposed as a possible mechanism that contributed to the rise of many human-specific features, including an increase in brain size and the emergence of human-specific cognitive traits. We analyzed mRNA expression in the prefrontal cortex of humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus macaques to determine whether human-specific neotenic changes are present at the gene expression level. We show that the brain transcriptome is dramatically remodeled during postnatal development and that developmental changes in the human brain are indeed delayed relative to other primates. This delay is not uniform across the human transcriptome but affects a specific subset of genes that play a potential role in neural development.

MindBlog is on the road again.

This is the time of year when I leave Fort Lauderdale with my new one year old children, shown in the photographs, to drive first to Austin Texas for a visit with my son and his wife, and then on to my home in Madison Wisconsin. (The photos show Marvin and Melvin checking out their carrier, then in the carrier on top of the car, but in fact they are given free range while in the car ). The posts in the queue this week for Tuesday through Friday are mainly passing on abstracts that I have found interesting, with an occasional figure.

The surprising power of neighborly advice.

I did a series of posts in June, 2006 abstracting Dan Gilberts book "Stumbling on Happiness." (You can use the blog search box to find them by entering the word "stumbling.") His main suggestion for knowing how you might actually feel emotionally about a desired future situation was simply to ask someone who has been there (become a successful doctor, actor, writer, etc.) Following in this vein, his group has recently obtained a very simple result concerning how people predict their future emotional reactions. Their abstract, following by some text:

Two experiments revealed that (i) people can more accurately predict their affective reactions to a future event when they know how a neighbor in their social network reacted to the event than when they know about the event itself and (ii) people do not believe this. Undergraduates made more accurate predictions about their affective reactions to a 5-minute speed date (n = 25) and to a peer evaluation (n = 88) when they knew only how another undergraduate had reacted to these events than when they had information about the events themselves. Both participants and independent judges mistakenly believed that predictions based on information about the event would be more accurate than predictions based on information about how another person had reacted to it.

Some context from the text of the article:

People make systematic errors when attempting to predict their affective reactions to future events...to overestimate how unhappy they will be after receiving bad test results, becoming disabled, or being denied a promotion, and to overestimate how happy they will be after winning a prize, initiating a romantic relationship, or taking revenge against those who have harmed them. Research suggests that the main reason people mispredict their affective reactions to future events is that they imagine those events inaccurately.

The 17th century writer François de La Rochefoucauld suggested that rather than mentally simulating a future event, people should consult those who have experienced it. "Before we set our hearts too much upon anything," he wrote, "let us first examine how happy those are who already possess it" . La Rochefoucauld was essentially suggesting that forecasters should use other people as surrogates for themselves, and the advantages of his "surrogation strategy" are clear: Because surrogation does not rely on mental simulation, it is immune to the many errors that inaccurate simulations produce.

The disadvantages of surrogation are also clear: Individuals differ, and thus, one person's affective reaction is almost certainly an imperfect predictor of another's. But there are at least two reasons to suspect that affective reactions are not as different as people may believe. First, affective reactions are produced in large part by physiological mechanisms that are evolutionarily ancient, which is why people the world over have very different beliefs and opinions but very similar affective reactions to a wide range of stimuli, preferring warm to cold, satiety to hunger, friends to enemies, winning to losing, and so on.

Their summary and conclusions:

In two experiments, participants more accurately predicted their affective reactions to a future event when they knew how a neighbor in their social network had reacted to it than when they knew about the event itself. Women made more accurate predictions about how much they would enjoy a date with a man when they knew how much another woman in their social network enjoyed dating the man than when they read the man's personal profile and saw his photograph. Men and women made more accurate predictions about how they would feel after being evaluated by a peer when they knew how another person in their social network had felt after being evaluated than when they previewed the evaluation itself. Although surrogation trumped simulation, both participants and independent judges had precisely the opposite intuition. By a wide margin, they believed that simulation was more likely than surrogation to produce accurate affective forecasts.

Two points are worthy of note. First, surrogation is by definition superior to simulation when individual differences are relatively small and simulations errors are relatively large, and it is inferior to simulation when the opposite is true. Although there is no way to know which of these is more typical in everyday life, the situations we studied—dating and peer-evaluation—are by no means exotic.

Second, although our experiments demonstrate the power of surrogation, they also suggest that people may not normally take advantage of this power. Our participants mistakenly believed that simulation was the superior strategy even after it had failed them, which suggests that people may be reluctant to engage in surrogation if they have the opportunity to do otherwise...it seems likely that in everyday life, La Rochefoucauld's advice—like the advice of good neighbors—is more often than not ignored. When we want to know our emotional futures, it is difficult to believe that a neighbor's experience can provide greater insight than our own best guess.

Language shapes fundamental unconscious visual perception.

From Thierry et al:

It is now established that native language affects one's perception of the world. However, it is unknown whether this effect is merely driven by conscious, language-based evaluation of the environment or whether it reflects fundamental differences in perceptual processing between individuals speaking different languages. Using brain potentials, we demonstrate that the existence in Greek of 2 color terms—ghalazio and ble—distinguishing light and dark blue leads to greater and faster perceptual discrimination of these colors in native speakers of Greek than in native speakers of English. The visual mismatch negativity, an index of automatic and preattentive change detection, was similar for blue and green deviant stimuli during a color oddball detection task in English participants, but it was significantly larger for blue than green deviant stimuli in native speakers of Greek. These findings establish an implicit effect of language-specific terminology on human color perception.

Previous choice shapes MRI signals reflecting future expectation and choice

An interesting piece from Dolan's group (open access) on correlates of future expected hedonic outcome:

Humans tend to modify their attitudes to align with past action. For example, after choosing between similarly valued alternatives, people rate the selected option as better than they originally did, and the rejected option as worse. However, it is unknown whether these modifications in evaluation reflect an underlying change in the physiological representation of a stimulus' expected hedonic value and our emotional response to it. Here, we addressed this question by combining participants' estimations of the pleasure they will derive from future events, with brain imaging data recorded while they imagined those events, both before, and after, choosing between them. Participants rated the selected alternatives as better after the decision stage relative to before, whereas discarded alternatives were valued less. Our functional magnetic resonance imaging findings reveal that postchoice changes in preference are tracked in caudate nucleus activity. Specifically, the difference in blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal associated with the selected and rejected stimuli was enhanced after a decision was taken, reflecting the choice that had just been made. This finding suggests that the physiological representation of a stimulus' expected hedonic value is altered by a commitment to it. Furthermore, before any revaluation induced by the decision process, our data show that BOLD signal in this same region reflects the choices we are likely to make at a later time.

Brain activity related to estimated hedonic experience. Regions in which BOLD response was positively correlated with participants' ratings of estimated hedonic experience included the right and left caudate nucleus, previously associated with reward expectancy (a), as well as the left amygdala (b), and left pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (c), both previously shown to be engaged when imagining positive future autobiographical events.

The decline of science journalism.

Brumfield writes an essay on the rise of science blogging alongside the decay of science journalism:
because of a generalized downturn, especially in newspaper revenues, the traditional media are shedding full-time science journalists...At the same time, researcher-run blogs and websites are growing apace in both number and readership.

An online 'science of happiness' course.

Foundations of Positive Psychology, from the University of Pennsylvania College of Liberal and Professional Studies.