Showing posts with label culture/politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label culture/politics. Show all posts

Thursday, December 07, 2023

Goggle's Bard and Chat GPT-4 on using AI to explore beyond language and words...

I show first the prompt I addressed yesterday afternoon to both Bard and ChatGPT-4.  The more nuanced response I received from Bard makes me wonder if Google has already started to use the new Gemini AI algorithms  announced yesterday to power Bard.  Here is the prompt, followed by the Bard and ChatGPT-4 responses:

Exploring beyond language and words - starting a conversation: Let us suppose that increasingly sophisticated LLMs, generative pretrained transformers, will become superior to humans in performing any linguistic chores requiring use and knowledge of all the world's written literature that was used as the training opus. This might free humans to pay more attention to understanding non-linguistic aspects of their experiences (such as non verbal music, art, prosody, body language, social mirroring, etc). Could you suggest ways in which AI could assist in defining and elucidating the non-linguistic aspects of our lives so that we might devote more of our attention to them rather than to linguistic chores ?

 
Google's Bard's response:
 
How AI could help us explore beyond language and words:

Your suggestion about increasingly sophisticated LLMs taking over linguistic tasks opens up a fascinating possibility: freeing humans to focus on non-linguistic aspects of experience. Here are some ways AI could assist us in this exploration:

1. Data analysis and pattern recognition:

  • Large-scale analysis of nonverbal communication: AI could analyze vast datasets of audio, video, and sensor data to identify patterns and relationships between nonverbal cues like facial expressions, gestures, posture, and vocal intonation. This could deepen our understanding of non-verbal communication in various contexts, from interpersonal communication to artistic expression.
  • Mapping emotions and mental states: AI could analyze physiological data like heart rate, skin conductance, and brain activity to identify correlations with emotions and mental states. This could lead to the development of tools that help us better understand our own and others' emotions, fostering empathy and improving communication.
  • Identifying patterns in non-verbal art forms: AI could analyze large collections of music, paintings, sculptures, and other non-verbal art forms to identify recurring patterns, styles, and themes. This could help us discover new insights into human creativity and unlock hidden meanings in art.

2. AI as a creative collaborator:

  • Generating novel forms of non-verbal communication: AI could be used to generate new forms of non-verbal communication, such as synthesized musical pieces, abstract visual art, or even gestures and facial expressions. This could lead to new artistic expressions and enhance communication beyond words.
  • Personalized non-verbal experiences: AI could personalize non-verbal experiences based on individual preferences and emotional states. For example, AI could curate music playlists or generate visual art that resonates with a user's mood. This could deepen our emotional engagement with non-verbal art forms and enhance our well-being.
  • Interactive storytelling and learning: AI could create interactive non-verbal narratives that adapt to user choices and emotions. This could provide engaging and personalized learning experiences in various fields, from language learning to cultural immersion.

3. AI as a facilitator for human interaction:

  • Real-time translation and interpretation of non-verbal cues: AI could be used to translate nonverbal cues in real-time, facilitating communication across cultures and bridging the gap between people with different communication styles.
  • Augmenting sensory experiences: AI could be used to create immersive virtual environments that stimulate various senses, allowing us to explore and interact with the world in new ways. This could broaden our understanding of non-verbal communication and deepen our appreciation for sensory experiences.
  • Promoting mindfulness and self-awareness: AI could be used to develop tools that help us become more aware of our own non-verbal communication and emotions. This could enhance our self-awareness and improve our ability to manage our emotions and relationships.

4. Ethical considerations:

While AI holds immense potential for assisting us in exploring the non-linguistic aspects of our lives, ethical considerations must be addressed. These include:

  • Bias and fairness: AI models are susceptible to biases present in the data they are trained on. It is crucial to ensure that AI tools used to analyze and interpret non-verbal communication are unbiased and fair.
  • Data privacy and security: The use of AI necessitates the collection and analysis of personal data. It is essential to ensure data privacy and security, safeguarding individuals' information from unauthorized access or misuse.
  • Human autonomy and control: AI should be used to enhance human understanding and experience, not replace it. We must ensure that AI remains a tool that empowers humans to explore and appreciate the non-linguistic aspects of life, not a force that dictates our thoughts and emotions.

By leveraging the power of AI responsibly and ethically, we can embark on a journey of deeper understanding and engagement with the non-linguistic aspects of our existence. This journey holds the potential to enrich our lives, strengthen our relationships, and unlock new forms of creativity and expression.

*********

ChatGPT-4's response:

The idea of AI assisting in understanding and elucidating non-linguistic aspects of human experience is intriguing and holds much potential. Here are several ways in which AI could be instrumental in this area:

  1. Enhanced Emotional Recognition and Analysis: AI can be trained to recognize and interpret human emotions through facial expressions, voice modulation, and body language. This would be particularly useful in enhancing interpersonal communication and understanding, especially in situations where verbal communication is limited or not possible.

  2. Music and Art Analysis: AI can analyze patterns, styles, and historical influences in music and art. By doing so, it can provide insights into the emotional and cultural contexts of various artworks or musical pieces, deepening our appreciation and understanding of these forms.

  3. Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality Experiences: AI can be used to create immersive VR and AR experiences that enable individuals to explore non-linguistic aspects of human culture and history, such as virtual tours of art galleries, historical sites, or even recreations of historical events.

  4. Non-Verbal Communication Training: AI can assist in teaching and improving non-verbal communication skills, such as understanding body language, gestures, and facial expressions, which are crucial for effective interpersonal interactions.

  5. Social Mirroring and Behavioral Analysis: AI can analyze social interactions and provide feedback or insights into social dynamics. This could be useful in understanding group behaviors, cultural norms, and even in improving social skills.

  6. Sensory Enhancement Technologies: AI-driven technologies could enhance or augment human senses, allowing for a deeper engagement with the non-linguistic elements of the world, such as experiencing a wider range of sounds or visual details.

  7. Emotional and Psychological Support: AI can offer personalized support and interventions based on non-linguistic cues, aiding in mental health and emotional well-being.

  8. Enhancing Creative Processes: AI can assist artists, musicians, and creators by suggesting non-linguistic elements that might enhance their work, based on analysis of vast amounts of artistic and musical data.

  9. Personalized Learning and Development: AI can tailor learning experiences to individual preferences and learning styles, focusing on non-linguistic methods like interactive simulations, visual aids, and hands-on activities.

  10. Cross-Cultural Understanding and Communication: AI can help bridge cultural gaps by providing insights into non-verbal cues and norms that are specific to different cultures, aiding in cross-cultural understanding and communication.

In all these ways, AI has the potential to significantly enrich human understanding and appreciation of the non-linguistic aspects of our lives, allowing us to engage more deeply with the world beyond words.

 



Sunday, November 26, 2023

Religious wars in the tech industry.

In this post I continue to use MindBlog as my private reference library to put down essential ideas I want to hang onto by extracting relevant clips, in this case from the most recent essay by Venkatesh Rao. Here are the clips:

Unless you’ve been hiding under a rock, you’ve probably heard something about the short but dramatic saga that unfolded at OpenAI over the last week…The Open AI saga doesn’t yet have a name, but I am calling it EAgate, after Effective Altruism or EA, one of the main religions involved in what was essentially an early skirmish in a brewing six-way religious war that looks set to last at least a decade…Not just for the AI sector, but for all of tech…We are not just unwilling to talk to perceived ideological adversaries, we are unable to do so; their terms of reference for talking about things feel so not-even-wrong, we are reduced to incredulous stares.

Incredulous stares are an inarticulate prelude to more consequential hostilities. Instead of civil or uncivil debate, or even talking past each other, we are reduced to demanding that others acquire literacy in our own religious discourses and notions of sacredness before even verbal hostilities can commence…actual engagement across mutually incompatible religious mental models has become impossible.

Want to criticize EA in terms that can even get through to them? You’d better learn to talk in terms of “alignment,” “orthogonality thesis,” “instrumental convergence,” and “coherent extrapolated volition” before they’ll even understand what you’re saying, let alone realize you’re making fun of them, or bother to engage in ritual hostilities with you.

Want to talk to the accelerationists? Be prepared to first shudder in theatrical awe at literal aliens and new life taking birth before us. You’re not capable of such allegorically overwrought awe? Trot out the incredulous stare.

Want to talk to the woke crowd? Be prepared to ignore everything actually interesting about the technology and talk in pious sermons about decolonization and bias in AI models. You’re not? Well, trot out the incredulous stare.

Want to talk to me? You’d better get up to speed on oozification, artificial time, mediocre computing, Labatutian-Lovecraftian-Ballardian cycles, and AI-crypto convergence. My little artisan religion is not among the big and popular ones precipitating boardroom struggles, but it’s in the fray here, and will of course prove to be the One True Faith. You’re not willing to dive into my profound writings on my extended universe of made-up concepts? Feel free to direct an incredulous stare at me and move on.

It’s not that there’s no common ground. Everyone agrees GPUs are important, Nvidia’s CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture) is evil, and that there are matrix multiplications going on somewhere. The problem is the part that is common ground is largely disconnected from the contentious bits.

In such a situation, we typically dispense with debates, hostile or otherwise, and skip right to active warfare. Religious warfare is perhaps continuation of incredulous staring by other means. Such as boardroom warfare where the idea of destroying the org is a valid option on the table, bombing datacenters suspected of harboring Unaligned GPUs (which some religious extremists have suggested doing), and in the future, perhaps actual hot wars.

Why do I think we are we entering a religious era? It’s a confluence of many factors, but the three primary ones, in my opinion, are: a) The vacuum of meaning created by the unraveling of the political landscape, b) the grand spectacle a dozen aging tech billionaires performing their philosopher-king midlife crises in public, and c) finally, the emergence of genuinely startling new technologies that nobody has yet successfully managed to wrap their minds around, not even the Charismatic Great Men from whom we have become accustomed to taking our cues.

The Six Religions

Here’s my list of primary religions, along with the specific manifestations in the events of EAgate… there are significant overlaps and loose alliances that can be mistaken for primary religions …as well as a long tail of more esoteric beliefs in the mix that aren’t really consequential yet.

The religion of Great Man Adoration (GMA): Represented in EAgate by the cult of personality that was revealed to exist, attached to Sam Altman.

The religion of Platform Paternalism (PP): Represented in EAgate by Microsoft and in particular the speak-softly-and-carry-a-big-stick leadership style of Satya Nadella.

The religion of Rationalism: Represented by the Effective Altruism (EA) movement. EA represented (and continues to represent) a particular millenarian notion of “AI safety” focused on the “X-risk” of runaway God-like AIs.
 
The religion of Accelerationism: Often referred to as e/acc (for Effective Accelerationism), initially an ironic/satirical response to EA that first emerged as a genre of memes a few years ago.
 
The religion of wokeness: Mostly on the sidelines for EAgate, it did appear briefly in a post-credits scene, as competing priesthoods briefly circled the question of the future of OpenAI’s new and too-small board.

The religion of neopaganism: Built around a “small gods” polytheistic vision of the future of AI, fueled by open-source models and cheap, commodity hardware once we’re past the current Nvidia-controlled GPU near-monopoly, this religion … is clearly helping shape the multi-faceted moral panic that is EA.

Why do I call these currents of thought religions, rather than merely contending political ideologies, such as those that featured in the culture wars of the last decade?

The reason is that all are shaped by their unique responses to fundamentally new phenomena being injected into the world by technology. These responses are about technology qua technology. …. Ordinary political interests, while present, are secondary.

The simmering religious wars of today are about the nature and meaning of emerging technologies themselves. And not just technologies with a retail presence like AI, crypto, and climate tech. It is no accident that geopolitics today is warily circling the TSMC fabs in Taiwan. Sub-3nm semiconductor manufacturing is yet another mysterious technological regime…

The technological revolutions are real even if the first responses lack the poetry and philosophical sophistication we have come to expect.

What comes next? As we get tired of holding each other in incredulous gazes, most of us will return to our chosen native religions to make sense of the unfolding reality.

Sunday, November 19, 2023

AI is infusing our daily lives. Is it an existential threat?

As AI is being subtly melded into our daily lives by the Google, Apple, and Microsoft clouds there is continuing debate over whether it is or Isn’t an existential threat. This debate has been brought to a head by the sudden and unexpected firing of Open AI’s chief executive Sam Altman and has starkly exposed the philosophical rift in the AI community between those who are more or less concerned about the potential risks of its untrammeled development. How many, if any, guardrails should be in place?. I have been on the techno-optimists side of this debate and passed on Marc Andreesen's rather extreme and overstated SubStack post titled "Why AI Will Save the World" in a June 23 MindBlog post. I was then completely horrified by his subsequent piece by this ideologist of the Silicon Valley elite titled "Fighting", which took a very positive view of Elon Musk challenging Mark Zuckerbert to a cage fight. I was going to write a piece on his dystopian future world, but two NYTimes pieces have done a better job at it than I could. They are Elizabeth Spiers "A Tech Overlord’s Horrifying, Silly Vision for Who Should Rule the World" and Ezra Klein's "The Chief Ideologist of the Silicon Valley Elite Has Some Strange Ideas".

Friday, November 10, 2023

Personalized chatbots and wearable AI devices for melding AI with our everyday lives

Personalized GPTs are here, but apparently not yet at the level of consumers like myself who don't want to do coding. I've been looking into making my own personal chatbot whose training data is 50 MB of my personal journal of about 20,000 pages. I would then like to query and chat with the resulting chatbot about events in my life since 1980. If anyone reading this has some advice, let me know!

Below are some URLs to my morning's reading:

These links are to articles from Kevin Roose, NYTimes tech columnist:  

Personalized A.I. Agents Are Here. Is the World Ready for Them?

Kevin Roose Hard Fork podcast (transcript available) on this and other AI topics 

And this article is on AI devices seeking to cut into smartphone dominance 

It points to two such devices: The Humane Ai Pin and The Rewind AI Pendant 

Friday, October 13, 2023

Blithe Spirits and Heavy Souls

This post is another abstracting/condensation of a recent Ventkatesh Rao essay with the title of this post (Its subtitle: ‘ Learning an experiential posture for the Permaweird.’) In this case, it is a 4-fold reduction in the words I need to scan through when I return to this MindBlog archive to recall the ideas.  

I’ve found some useful “unexpected validation for unexpressed thoughts the reader already holds’” in his contrasting of ‘insight porn’ with ‘presence prose,”  as well as his distinction of Blithe Spirits and Heary Souls to make the point that you don’t have to retreat from the world to feel good.

Rao doesn’t make it easy on readers. He assumes a thorough knowledge of contemporary and classical culture.  I suggest going to bard.goole.com if  references to ‘fingerspitzengefühl’, ’Red Pill/Blue Pill’ , or ‘larps’ mystify you. Here’s my reduction:

…the kind of writing I am choosing to do is vaguely unsatisfying.. in “the endocrine circuitry and muscle memory around this behavior isn’t tuned right” way. The vibe is off. I’m “not feeling it.” It feels like more of a grind…writing in the kind of hard mode I’m in right now, when the fingerspitzengefühl doesn’t feel quite right, feels draining rather than energizing. It has the desired objective outcomes, but lacks the subjective payoff.

I think the problem isn’t with me, but the growing fogginess of the world. So let’s start by looking at why insight porn used to work, why it stopped working, why writing in the new mode feels less satisfying, and why that’s actually a good thing.

Insight porn works by covertly constructing satisfying models of the world starting with nuggets of unexpected validation for unexpressed thoughts the reader already holds…Insight porn rarely tells you something you don’t know. Instead, it gives you permission to consciously believe something you already unconsciously suspect to be true, and to drop the opposed belief you didn’t realize you were only pretending to hold. That’s why a sense of relief is a primary response to consuming good insight porn.

Insight porn at its most sophisticated was a delivery mechanism for pills, as in red pill/blue pill…With relatively few words, you could “pill” people in various ways, using oblique approaches against which they had few cognitive defenses, causing large sections of their world-views to collapse, generally in favor of some flavor of cynical anomie or radicalized fervor, and they’d thank you for it…with an array of pills, eroding and destabilizing the entire landscape of worldviews…

…it was actually a useful, perhaps even critical thing to be doing roughly between 2009-17, when serious problems were beginning to manifest across the civilizational stack. If mental models hadn’t been developing cracks and fissures along with the worlds they were supposed to be describing, we’d all have suffered much more mightily than we did through the culture wars and Great Weirding. Through the shadow war of mass, mutual pilling, we inoculated ourselves with a diverse array satirical skepticisms of the prevailing societal order. We became better prepared to inhabit the Permaweird we now find ourselves in.

****

The kind of writing I’ve been practicing … over the last few years is about trying to make myself, and the reader, feel present in the world. Let’s call it presence prose. …One visible sign of this is that I often talk about current events these days, which I rarely did ten years ago. I actively aimed for “timeless” a decade ago. Now, at least in this newsletter, I’m fine with transient relevance… presence prose is not news. Nor is it “analysis” in any legibly scoped and bounded way (analysis within a “niche” is another 2010s genre of writing that feels increasingly dated these days). It’s a kind of mental time travel into a mode of experiencing some leaky corner of the entangled world in real time.
 
To write for presence, you must begin by setting aside mental models and theories in favor of whatever flow of raw data you can find and consume…. Where possible, you must also travel closer to empirical and phenomenological sources, while being ever mindful of the fact that such close-in loci today also feature people consciously crafting livestreamed narrative theaters of validation rather than actually paying attention. Such people are part of the phenomenology you must make sense of. Elon Musk visiting the US border isn’t a citizen journalist looking into the immigrant crisis there. It is a bit of theater that is itself part of that crisis, which comes swaddled in multiple overlapping theaters of this sort.

***

The thing is, insight porn is simply more satisfying to produce and consume than presence prose. Writing or reading in that mode reliably produces the dopamine required to produce or consume more. While not quite entertainment — insight porn has utility, and often calls for demanding levels of effort on both sides — you don’t do it for the utility.

A diet of insight porn, I think, creates and sustains a certain light-hearted and carefree way of being present in the world. It turns you into a blithe spirit. Under the right conditions, it can make you worldy, yet carefree. You feel present in the world, but untroubled, if not untouched, by your experiences in it.

The right conditions are obvious: This diet works when the world is doing well enough, at least for you, that you don’t have to choose between being present and feeling good. When most of the things you could choose to think, write, or read about, or even directly experience, are pleasant. When you only have to add a calibrated amount of discomfort through insight porn to feel present, like a dash of pepper on bland food, there are no real tough choices to be made.

Through the 2000s and 2010s, even my most serious-minded and altruistic friends, working on difficult social problems that entailed a great deal of misery for other living beings (both human and animal) typically could find refuge in other areas of interest that were pleasant to think about. The subsisted on a diet of insight porn. The world had problems, and if you were in a position of privilege, you could choose to work on some of them, but it didn’t look like a dumpster fire in every direction. You didn’t have to put yourself through escape-artist contortions to indulge in a bit of restorative escapism. You didn’t have to build entire reactionary larps to inhabit.

You didn’t have to retreat from the world to feel good.

it does seem that regardless of ideology or how hopped up on pills you are, the dumpster-fire index has been growing higher for everybody. In 2023, it is still possible to hold on to a generally pollyannish worldview of all being for the best in this best of all possible worlds, but it takes significantly more cognitive effort than in 2013. Having a mansion helps, which is one reason I’m scheming to get one. Having a particular talent for a an absorbing pursuit of excellence in something like wood-working in a cabin in the woods helps as well.

What are the consequences of polyannish postures being more expensive and less attractive to sustain?

From my observations, I’d say most people switch modes. They go from being blithe spirits to being heavy souls. People who operate with a default mindset of a sense of a world on fire, a default joyless world where ease and pleasure do not come naturally,

Most people, I suspect, have a preference for one mode or the other, but don’t have psyches rigidly anchored to either blithe spiritedness or heavy soulfulness. Depending on the dumpster-fieriness of the world, most people can experience either mode of being. I suspect most of us are naturally blithe-spirited, just as most of us are naturally right-handed. But we can all experience heavy souls, just as we can all use our left hands. And as with left-handed behaviors, heavy souled behaviors are awkward, janky, and unnatural for most people.

I certainly am naturally blithe-spirited. I don’t go out of my way to see the world as a dumpster fire, even if I don’t go out of my way to retreat from a pressing sense that it is. The preference is perhaps not as strong as my right-handedness. I can only write slowly and very badly with my left hand, but I can write tolerably well in heavy-soul mode. Almost as well as I can in a blithe-spirit mode.

This understanding feels correct to me. Writing today feels unsatisfying today in the same way using my left hand for a task requiring any sort of dexterity does. The fingerspitzengefühl is off because I’m using fingerspitzen I’m not used to using. I’m not feeling it, because I don’t often use this hand, and the finger-tips haven’t developed as much sensitivity.

But I’m getting slightly more comfortable with each essay. And the resulting posture in the world feels slightly less wrong each time. I don’t think I’d go back to a blithe spirit posture even if I could. Any more than I’d go back to right-handedness if I managed to practice my way into full ambidexterity.

The world is changing, and it feels right to change with it. And if the appropriate posture for experiencing the Permaweird is a heavy-souled one, so be it.

Monday, October 02, 2023

Fluid Fogs and Fixed Flows

For the MindBlog readers who may have have noted my  "This is the New 'Real World' post and followed me down the rabbit hole of Ventkatesh Rao’s narrative worlds, I pass on the following abstracting  of his 9/23/2023  installment, titled “Fluid Fogs and Fixed Flows,”  which reduces its length by half. I have done this mainly for my own use, to facilitate my future recall of his ideas:

Worlds and Real World

To briefly recap last week’s essay, I’m using world and real world in the sense of last week’s essay: A world is a coherent, immersive, totalizing subjectivity you can inhabit, as a sort of cognitive indoors. The real world is the corresponding outdoors — the messy union of the dozen or so most consequential worlds in existence at any given time.

The process by which the real world emerges, as a negotiation among worlds, is one that makes it qualitatively different. In brief, regular worlds are finite games, while the real world is the infinite game.

Weirdness, Fog, and Unnarratability

The relationship between weirdness, brain fog, and unnarratability is something like the relationship between a crisis, the panic it induces, and the solvability of the crisis.

World-brain fog affects those in a given world. Real-world-brain fog affects everybody. For us individual sentient elements of these world-brains, this fog manifests as the spectacle of history becoming incoherent.

Fog vs. Flow

The opposite of brain fog is flow. When thoughts flow easily, clearly, and tastefully, from one idea to the right next idea...Where the one-step-at-a-time ethos I identified earlier in this series as the essence of never-ending stories is not just all you can live by, it’s all you need to live by.

To be clear, I’m not saying fog is bad and flow is good. That would be like saying clear weather is good and storms are bad. This is just a pair of opposed subjective cognitive conditions. Setting aside valuative judgments, my claim is that the real-world-brain is in a state of fog rather than flow right now.

To say that the real world is suffering from world-brain fog is to say that the infinite game is in narrative trouble, regardless of the prevailing calculus of winners and losers in the constituent finite games. The question of winners and losers is distinct from the question of whether the game can be continued. The real world being foggy means it is hard to see how to continue the game, whether you’re currently winning or losing any specific game.

Okay, so that’s the big thesis here: history feels far more unnarratable than it needs to, because the real world is suffering from world-brain fog. If we can get rid of this fog, we’ll still have to deal with the objective realities of the permaweird, but that might be an easier task.

Individual Fogs

To think through the idea of a foggy real-world brain, it’s useful to think about the more familiar individual-brain phenomenon.

I’ll use myself as an example to analyze these factors...Looking back 10 years at my 2013 archives, 2023’s output of words feels like a congealed sludge by comparison. ..The sludginess of 2023 seems to afflict all words being produced by everybody.

In the last couple of years, this god-like situation awareness of the broad currents of my own thought has become dissipated, fragmented, and yes, foggy. I often forget obvious connections I’ve made in the past, or worse, fail to make them in the first place. Sometimes I forget entire trails of thought I’ve gone down, over multiple essays. Sometimes I clumsily re-think thoughts I’ve previously thought in more elegant ways. There is no sense of a longer compounding journey unfolding over years and millions of words. Instead, there is a sense of a random walk comprising individual short outings of a few thousand words. When the fog is at its worst, the 2 million words seem like so much rubble.

So my individual brain fog in the sense of such missed connections and missed opportunities for emergence is bad for the kind of thinking and writing I do. The fog/flow pair is neutral, but for certain kinds of activity, such as thinking and writing in hypertext-augmented ways, fog is very bad. Just like literal fog is very bad for ships trying to navigate treacherous waters.

The largest fraction of the value of writing online in a densely internally linked way³ lies in the larger structures of thought that emerge. I’ve previously jokingly referred to my personal instance of this as the “extended ribbonfarm blogamatic universe,” but more seriously and generally, we might call these personal protocol narratives. It’s a particular way of being in the infinite game, one step at a time, that’s available to writers. Anyone who writes primarily online, with a lot of nonlinear internal hyperlinking, has a personal protocol narrative by default. Traditional writers usually don’t, unless they work extra hard for it⁴ (something I'm too lazy to do, which makes me think in a non-internet world, I wouldn’t be a writer).

This superpower is the reason people like me eschew traditional media and book-writing and largely stick to blogs, microblogs, and newsletters. Not only is the emergent landscape the bulk of the value, it is the main enabling factor in its own creation. I can write in certain ways because I have this evolving canvas doing most of the work. If this emergent landscape of thought starts to disappear, the whole thing falls apart.

And while hypertext is a powerful brain-augmentation technology, it can’t defend against all cognitive afflictions. In particular, brain fog is deadly. It weakens your ability to make new internal links, and as a result makes the connected landscape less connected, and therefore both less useful, and less usable. Brain fog drives a vicious cycle of degeneration towards a more primitive textuality. At some point, I might have no technical advantage at all over book-writing cavemen or even typewriter-wielding Neanderthals.

Entangled Fogs

Some technologies are simply foggier than others…mail newsletter platforms are much foggier than blogs…blogs simply want to create rich internal linking..I use an order of magnitude fewer links in newsletters than in blog posts. I know this because I still retain stronger gestalt memories of my blog archives than my newsletter archives.

Biology and technology conspire to create brain fog in messy ways. When I got Covid a year ago, and experienced a few months of a more biological style brain fog, writing in my peculiar way felt insanely difficult, and what writing I was able to do was much more disconnected than my norm…much of brain fog can and should be attributed to factors in the environment. Just as your panic at being caught in a fire isn’t entirely in your head — there is actually a fire — brain fog isn’t all in your head: you’re in a foggy condition. You’re in an unnarratable world. The stories that you want to tell, and are used to telling, are suddenly less tellable.

This is where the entanglement with world-brain fog comes in.

Accounting for age, medium, and Covid-type effects, I think there remains a large unexplained factor in every case, though the fraction varies….I think there is something going on at the cultural, societal level, that makes it vastly harder to remember the gist of large bodies of information…But if I am right, unnarratability and world-brain fog should affect everybody, regardless of age and occupation, and I think I see signs everywhere that this is the case.

Fixed and Fluid Logics of Caring

Now we can ask the question. What does it mean for a world, specifically the real world to experience something analogous to what I just described at the individual level? What is world-brain fog? …And since there is nobody “there” to experience it, how does it manifest in the lives of us individuals who are like the neurons of the world brains we inhabit?

We’ve already seen one element of what it feels like. A sense that there’s more fogginess than you can attribute to your own circumstances…Here’s another: it’s hard to decide what to care about. Logics of caring are in fact essential in creating flow out of fog. The world is always complex. What you care about is what determines how simple it is for you. How you pick what to care about is your logic of caring.

…you might want a locus of care that is both stable, and world-like. This disposition is what I’m calling fixed logic of care…People with fixed logics of care love to talk about values, because that’s where the fixedness manifests explicitly.

…you might want a locus of care that follows the liveliest streams of events in the world. …You want to be where the action is, not where your values point. This disposition is a fluid logic of care.

fixed/fluid not the same as conservative/liberal,traditional/progressive, winning/losing

It might seem like I’ve set up an argument that admits no world-scale flow at all for either fixed or fluid logics of caring. This is incorrect. A few well-defined groups sneak through this sieve of constraints and appear to be experiencing world-scale flow. All of them operate by fixed logics of caring, but also have an additional factor in common: they rest atop what I call interposing intelligences.

Interposing Intelligences

The first well-defined group that seems to have retained a sense of world-scale flow is economists…anyone for whom the the global economy is the primary sense-making lens on reality…it’s all just been a game of watching various numbers go up and down in a curiously ahistorical mirror world. In that mirror world, there has been no Great Weirding.

There’s a reason for this. The economy offers one of the few remaining world-scale fixed logics of caring. To care through that logic about anything in the world at all is to care about it in economic terms. There’s even a term for this operation of bringing a matter into the fixed logic of care: “pricing it in.” To the economist-mind, economics is the primary phenomenological ground of the world. Things don’t become real until they become economically real. Intentions don’t become real until they become revealed preferences. Narratives don’t become real until they show up in indicators.

Now this is interesting. Economics seems to function in modernity as a better religion than actual religions. It allows you to have a sense of inhabiting the world rather than a besieged, paranoid corner of it. It allows you to care about the world in a fixed way, while still keeping up reasonably with its fluid, dynamic, changing nature. What it cannot accommodate, it can confidently treat as noise.

Unlike the changeless, distant gods or Gods of traditional religions, the God of economics is a live intelligence, doing all the fluid thinking so you can care in fixed ways. And it’s obvious why it’s able to do that. The economy is, after all, the closest thing to a live, planet-scale artificial intelligence.A different way to think about this helps generalize from this one data point. Economics provides a fixed logic of caring despite a complex, Permaweird world because it rests atop a vast, interposing⁵ intelligence that processes or tunes out most of the weirdness. A kind of intelligence that religion once embodied in a slower, less weird era. A Turing-complete pre-processing/post-processing layer, mediating your relationship to reality. I’m using the term interposing intelligence rather than container or matrix because the mediation has a more open and leaky topology. It allows you to compute with reality data more easily, but doesn’t necessarily seal you off in a bubble reality. Interposing intelligences are more like slippers than spacesuits; more like gardens than arcologies.

The cryptoeconomy is another obvious example, with blockchains playing the role of the interposing intelligence.

A third world is the world of machine learning, which is a rather on-the-nose kind of interposing intelligence layer. … There is a new world of people being born, whose relationship to reality is beginning to be entirely mediated by the interposing intelligence of machine learning.  

A fourth world is perhaps the oldest: the global institutional landscape peopled by careerists devoted to individual institutions. It’s not as obvious as in the case of the economy, but the institutional world (which its critics often refer to as the global Deep State) and its inhabitants (whom critics tend to refer to uniformly as “bureaucrats”) is in fact a world-scale computer that sustains a fixed logic of caring within itself. Shorn of the conspiratorial fantasies of critics, deep state is not a bad term for it.

Is there a way to hold on to a fixed logic of caring, without retreating from the world, and without resting on top of an interposing intelligence? I don’t think this is possible anymore.

Find Fluidity

The problem with everybody switching to fixed logics of caring is that it doesn’t solve the fogginess of the real world. In fact, even if all dozen or so consequential worlds that make up the real world were to harden into de facto fixed-logics-of-caring worlds that individually found flow within, you would still not be free of the fog in the real world. Combating fog in the real world requires at least a fraction of humanity operating by fluid logics of caring.

to want a fluid logic of care is to want “a locus of care that follows the liveliest streams of events in the world. …it used to work well until about 2015,

You could care about tech, for example. What was good for tech was good for the world, and vice versa. But unlike economics, tech does not offer a fixed logic for how to care.
Cosmopolitan globalism was another. Pre-wokism social justice was a third. Following basic scientific advances was a fourth.

But all these examples have “failed” in a certain way since 2015. You can still operate by them, but you will get lost in fog and lose all sense of flow. As a result, all these example worlds have succumbed to sclerotic fixed logics imported from adjacent domains. Technology is increasingly applied investment economics. Cosmopolitan globalism and social justice are now both applied Deep Statisms. No doubt other once-fluid logics of caring will get “compiled,” as it were, to fixed logics of caring running atop interposing intelligence layers.

So is there a way to retain a fluid logic of caring?
Reality — and this time I mean material reality — does indeed have a liberal bias in a rather precise
sense: it requires fluid logics of caring to de-fog. A logic of caring that follows the action instead of being driven by values.

No combination of fixed logics of caring will do the trick. Nor will operating atop a fixed interposing intelligence layer.

Multiple Interposing Intelligences

My big takeaway from the analysis so far is this: there is no way to retain flow in the world today without augmenting your intelligence in some way. This is evident even in my personal, rather primitive case of using hypertext as an integral element of my writing and sensemaking.

This is why all known examples of worlds in flow today rest atop powerful interposing intelligence layers that mediate relations to reality: the economy, blockchains, AI itself, and institutions. But the inescapable cost of this seems to be that fluid logics of caring become fixed, and our sense of the real world, as opposed to our favored individual ones, becomes vulnerable to fog.

To retain fluidity, you must retain an unmediated connection to reality. But the unaugmented brain is clearly not enough for that connection to be tractable to manage.

How do you resolve this paradox?

I think the trick is to inhabit more than one interposing intelligence layer. If you’re only an economist or only a deep-state institutionalist, you’ll retreat to a fixed logic of caring; a terminal derp.

But if you’re both, the possibility of fluid logics of caring remains, because the two interposing varieties of intelligence are not compatible. Sometimes they will be in conflict when they try to mediate your presence in the world. And in that conflict, you will find just enough of an unmediated connection to reality to continue caring about the world in a fluid way, without becoming overwhelmed by complexity.

A specific example of this is thinking about holding the stock of a company you work for. Both economic and institutional logics of caring apply, but neither provides a complete answer to the question of how much of the stock to hold, and when to sell. The two fixed answers will likely be incompatible, so you’ll need a fluid logic to integrate them. If you’re in the public sector, voting on taxes creates a similar tension.

I listed 4 world-scale interposing intelligences earlier, and each pairing seems to work well. Cryptoeconomics and traditional economics seem caught in a dialectic of discovering each other’s fundamental flaws and destablizing each other. Machine learning and blockchains seem headed for a collision via zero-knowledge proof technologies. Institutionalism and blockchains seem headed for a collision via smart contract technology. Institutionalism and economics have been the locus of the familiar Left/Right tension across the world.

I’ll let you work out the other combinations, but if you’ve tried thinking about the world through any two of the available interposing intelligences, you’ll realize how difficult it is. Difficult, but it’s possible. And at least in my case, the more I practice, the better I get at this (I try to straddle all four of the ones I’ve listed).

Why does this work? Why does it serve to “continue the game” in infinite game terms? One way to think about it is to think about life in terms of step-by-step decisions.

If you live within a traditional world that does not supply an interposing intelligence layer at all, you will mostly not have any decision-support at all that can keep up. Your decisions outside your shrinking world will be random and chaotic. Your instinct will be to restrict scope until all decisions are within the scope of your logic of caring, whether fluid or fixed.

If you live atop a single interposing intelligence, you will always have meaningful decision-support within a fixed logic of caring. You’ll have a take on everything, nad feel in flow within your world, but have a sense of the “real world” you share with others being in a state of insane chaos. It would all make sense and flow beautifully if only those others stopped being stupid and joined your world.

But if you live atop more than one interposing intelligence, you will have to choose at every step whether to tap into one of the available fixed logics of caring (picking a side), or improvising your own choice. In the latter case, your thinking will leak through and connect to reality in an unmediated way. If you’re able to do this consistently, you will likely experience increasing amounts of flow, and also beat back the fogginess of the real world, not just your own world.

And this notion of straddling a sort of plate-tectonics of multiple interposing intelligences, with gaps, faultlines and inconsistencies, is the reason the resulting narrative is a kind of protocol narrative. The narrative of the real world emerges out of an interoperable network of world narratives. And through the conflicts between worlds, the infinite game keeps renewing itself.

But it takes a critical mass of humans operating by fluid logics of caring for this to happen. And until that critical mass is reached, the real world will remain foggy for everybody. And trying to be in that minority will be a thankless and stressful task, immersed in fog.
But then again, public service has never been an easy calling.


Friday, September 29, 2023

AI, a boon for science and a disaster for creatives

The Sept. 16 issue of the Economist has two excellent articles: How artificial intelligence can revolutionise science and How scientists are using artificial intelligence. I pass on here some edited clips from the first of these articles. I also want to point to much less benign commentary on how AI is moving toward threatening the livelihoods of creators of music, art, and literature: The Internet Is About to Get Much Worse.  

Could AI turbocharge scientific progress and lead to a golden age of discovery?

Some believe that AI can turbocharge scientific progress and lead to a golden age of discovery...Such claims provide a useful counterbalance to fears about large-scale unemployment and killer robots.
Many previous technologies have been falsely hailed as panaceas. The electric telegraph was lauded in the 1850s as a herald of world peace, as were aircraft in the 1900s; pundits in the 1990s said the internet would reduce inequality and eradicate nationalism...but there have been several periods in history when new approaches and new tools did indeed help bring about bursts of world-changing scientific discovery and innovation.
In the 17th century microscopes and telescopes opened up new vistas of discovery and encouraged researchers to favour their own observations over the received wisdom of antiquity, while the introduction of scientific journals gave them new ways to share and publicise their findings. The result was rapid progress in astronomy, physics and other fields, and new inventions from the pendulum clock to the steam engine—the prime mover of the Industrial Revolution.
Then, starting in the late 19th century, the establishment of research laboratories, which brought together ideas, people and materials on an industrial scale, gave rise to further innovations such as artificial fertiliser, pharmaceuticals and the transistor, the building block of the computer..the journal and the laboratory went further still: they altered scientific practice itself and unlocked more powerful means of making discoveries, by allowing people and ideas to mingle in new ways and on a larger scale. AI, too, has the potential to set off such a transformation.
Two areas in particular look promising. The first is “literature-based discovery” (LBD), which involves analysing existing scientific literature, using ChatGPT-style language analysis, to look for new hypotheses, connections or ideas that humans may have missed. LBD is showing promise in identifying new experiments to try—and even suggesting potential research collaborators.
The second area is “robot scientists”, also known as “self-driving labs”. These are robotic systems that use AI to form new hypotheses, based on analysis of existing data and literature, and then test those hypotheses by performing hundreds or thousands of experiments, in fields including systems biology and materials science. Unlike human scientists, robots are less attached to previous results, less driven by bias—and, crucially, easy to replicate.
In 1665, during a period of rapid scientific progress, Robert Hooke, an English polymath, described the advent of new scientific instruments such as the microscope and telescope as “the adding of artificial organs to the natural”. They let researchers explore previously inaccessible realms and discover things in new ways, “with prodigious benefit to all sorts of useful knowledge”. For Hooke’s modern-day successors, the adding of artificial intelligence to the scientific toolkit is poised to do the same in the coming years—with similarly world-changing results.

Friday, September 22, 2023

This is the New 'Real World'

For my own later reference, and hopefully of use to a few MindBlog readers,  I have edited, cut and pasted, and condensed from 3960 to 1933 words the latest brilliant article generated by Venkatesh Rao at https://studio.ribbonfarm.com/:

The word world, when preceded by the immodest adjective real, is a self-consciously anthropocentric one, unlike planet, or universe. To ask, what sort of world do we live in invites an inherently absurd answer when we ponder what kind of world we live in. but if enough people believe in an absurd world, absurd but consequential histories will unfold. And consequentiality, if not truth, perhaps deserves the adjective real. 

Not all individual worlds that in principle contribute to the real world are equally consequential… A familiar recent historical real world, the neoliberal world, was shaped more by the beliefs of central bankers than by the beliefs of UFO-trackers. You could argue that macroeconomic theories held by central bankers are not much less fictional than UFOs. But worlds built around belief in specific macroeconomic theories mattered more than ones built around belief in UFOs. In 2003 at least, it would have been safe to assume this  - it is no longer a safe assumption in 2023.

Of the few hundred  consciously shared worlds like religions, fandoms, and nationalisms that are significant, perhaps a couple of dozen matter strongly, and perhaps a dozen matter visibly, the other dozen being comprised of various sorts of black or gray swans lurking in the margins of globally recognized consequentiality.

This then, is the “real” world — the dozen or so worlds that visibly matter in shaping the context of all our lives…The consequentiality of the real world is partly a self-fulfilling prophecy of its own reality. Something that can play the rule of truth. For a while.

The fact that some worlds survive a brutal winnowing process does not alter the fact that they remain anthropocentric is/ought conceits … A world that has made the cut to significance and consequentiality, to the level of mattering, must still survive its encounters with material, as opposed to social realities... For all the consequential might of the Catholic Church in the 17th century, it was Galileo’s much punier Eppur si muove world that eventually ended up mattering more. Truth eventually outweighed short-term consequentiality in the enduring composition of real.

It would take a couple of centuries for Galileo’s world to be counted among the ones that mattered, in shaping the real world. And the world of the Catholic Church, despite centuries of slow decline still matters..It is just that the real world has gotten much bigger in scope, and other worlds constituting it, like the one shaping the design of the iPhone 15, matter much more.

…to answer a question like what sort of world do we live in? is to craft an unwieldy composite portrait out of the dozen or so constituent worlds that matter at any given time …it is a fragile, unreliable, dubious, borderline incoherent, unsatisfying house of cards destined to die. Yet, while it lives and reigns, it is an all-consuming, all-dominating thing… the “real” world is not necessarily any more real than private fantasies. It is merely vastly more consequential — for a while.

When “the real world” goes away because we’ve stopped believing in it, as tends to happen every few decades, it can feel like material reality itself, rather than a socially constructed state of mind, has come undone. And we scramble to construct a new real world. It is a necessary human tendency. Humans need a real world to serve as a cognitive “outdoors” (and escape from “indoors”), even if they are not eternal or true. A shared place we can accuse each other of not living in, and being detached from…Humans will conspire to cobble together a dozen new fantasies and label it real world, and you and I will have to live in it too.

So it is worth asking the question, what sort of world do we live in? And it is worth actually constructing the answer, and giving it the name the real world, and using it to navigate life — for a while.

So let’s take a stab at it.

The real world of the early eighties was one defined by the boundary conditions of the Cold War, an Ozone hole, PCs, video games, Michael Jackson, a pre-internet social fabric, and no pictures of Uranus, Neptune, Pluto, or black holes shaping our sense of the place of our planet within the broader cosmos.

The real world that took shape in the nineties, the neoliberal world to which Margaret Thatcher declared there is no alternative (TINA), was one defined by the rise of the internet, unipolar geopolitics, the economic ascent of China, The Simpsons, Islamic terrorism, and perhaps most importantly, a sense of politics ceasing to matter against the backdrop of an unstoppable increase in global prosperity.

That real world began to wobble after 9/11, bust critical seams during the Great Recession, and started to go away in earnest after 2015, in the half-decade, which ended with the pandemic. The passing of the neoliberal world was experienced as a trauma across the world, even by those who managed to credibly declare themselves winners.

What has taken shape in the early 20s defies a believable characterization as real, for winners and losers alike. Declaring it weird  studiously avoids assessments of realness. Some, like me, go further and declare the world to be permaweird…the weirdness is here to stay.

Permaweird does not mean perma-unreal. The elusiveness of a “New Normal” does not mean no “New Real” can emerge, out of new, and learnable, patterns of agency and consequentiality…the forces shaping the New Real are becoming clear. Here is a list off the top of my head. It should be entirely unsurprising.

1 Energy transition
2 Aging population
3 Weird weather
4 Machine learning
5 Memefied politics
6 The slowing of Moore’s Law
7 Meaning crises (plural)
8 Stagnation of the West
9 Rise of the Rest
10 Post-ZIRP economics
11 Post-Covid supply chains
12 Climate refugee movements

You will notice that none the forces on the list is particularly new or individually very weird. What’s weird is the set as a whole, and the difficulty of putting them together into a notion of normalcy.

Forces though, are not worlds. We may trade in our gasoline-fueled cars for EVs, but we do not inhabit “the energy transition” the way we inhabit a world-idea like “neoliberalism” or “religion.”

Sometimes forces directly translate into consequential worlds. In the 1990s, the internet was a force shaping the real world, and also created a world — the inhabitable world of the very online — that was part of the then-emerging sense of “real.”

Sometimes forces indirectly create worlds. Low-interest rates created another important constituent world of the Old Real …Vast populations in liberal urban enclaves lived out ZIRPy lifestyles, eating their avocado toast, watching TED talks, riding sidewalk scooters, producing “content”, and perversely refusing to be rich enough to buy homes.

Something similar appears to be happening in response to the force of post-ZIRP economics. The public internet, dominated by vast global melting-pot platforms featuring vast culture wars, appears to be giving way to a mix of what I’ve called cozyweb enclaves and protocol media,…This world too, will be positioned to consequentially shape the New Real as strongly as the very online world shaped the Old Real.

I won’t try to provide careful arguments here, or justify my speculative inventory of forces, but here is my list of resulting worlds being carved out by them, which I have arrived at via a purely impressionistic leap of attempted synthesis. Together, these worlds constitute the New Real:

1 Climate refugee world
2 Disaster world (the set of places currently experiencing disaster conditions)
3 Dark Forest online world
4 Death-star world (centered on the assemblage of spaces controlled by declining wealth or power concentrations)
5 Non-English civilizational worlds (including Chinese and Indian)
6 Weird weather worlds
7 Non-institutional world (including, but not limited to, free-agent and blockchain-based worlds)
8 Trad Retvrn LARP world
9 Retiree world
10 Silicon realpolitik world
11 AI-experienced world
12 Resource-localism world (set of spaces shaped by a dominant scarce resource like energy or water)

These worlds are worlds because it is possible to imagine lifestyles entirely immersed in them. They are consequential worlds because each already has enough momentum and historical leverage to reshape the composite understanding of real. What climate refugees do in climate refugee world will shape what all of us do in the real world.

World 4 is worth some elaboration. In it I include almost everything that dominates current headlines and feels “real,” including spaces dominated by billionaires, governments, universities, and traditional media. Yet, despite the degree to which it dominates the current distribution of attention, my sense is that it has only a small and diminishing role to play in defining the New Real. When we use the phrase in the real world in the coming decade, we will not mainly be referring to World 4.

World 11 is also worth some elaboration. One reason I believe weirdness is here to stay is that the emerging ontologies of the New Real are neither entirely human in origin, nor likely to respect human desires for common-sense conceptual stability in “reality.

For the moment, AIs inhabit the world on our terms, relating to it through our categories. But it is already clear that they are not restricted to human categories, or even to categories expressible within human languages. Nor should they be, if we are to tap into their powers. They are limited by human ontology only to the extent that their presence in the world must be mediated by humans. … they will definitely evolve in ways that keep the real world permaweird.

Can we slap on a usefully descriptive short label onto the New Real, comparable to “Neoliberal World” or “Cold War World”?  

There is no such obviously dominant eigenvector of consequentiality in the New Real, but the most obvious candidate is probably global warming. So we might call the New Real the warming world. Somehow though, it doesn’t feel like warming shapes our experience of realness as clearly as its predecessors. Powerful though the calculus of climate change is, it operates via too many subtle degrees of indirection to shape our sense of the real. Still, I’ll leave the phrase there for your consideration.

An idiosyncratic personal candidate … is magic-realist world. A world that is consequentially real and permaweird is a world that feels magical and real at the same time, and is sustainably inhabitable: but only if you let go a craving for a sense of normalcy.

It offers unprecedented, god-like modes of agency that are available for almost anyone to exercise…The catch is this — attachment to normalcy equals learned helplessness in the face of all this agency. If you want to feel normal, almost none of the magical agency is available to you. An attachment to normalcy limits you to mere magical thinking, in the comforting company of an equally helpless majority. If you are willing to live with a sense of magical realism, a great deal more suddenly opens up.

This, I suspect, is the flip side of the idea that “we are as gods, and might as well get good at it.” There is no normal way to feel like a god. A magical being must necessarily experience the world as a magical doing. To experience the world as permaweird, is to experience it as a god.

This is not necessarily an optimistic thought. A real world, shaped by god-like humans, each operating by an idiosyncratic sense of their own magical agency, is not necessarily a good world, or a world that conjures up effective collective responses to its shared planetary problems.

But it is a world that does something, rather than nothing, and that’s a start.

Friday, September 15, 2023

What we seek to save when we seek to save the world

Yet anoather fascinating set of ideas from Venkatesh Rao that I want to save for myself by doing a MindBlog post of some clips from the piece.
...threats that provoke savior responses are generally more legible than the worlds that the saviors seek to save, or the mechanisms of destruction...I made up a 2x2 to classify the notions of worlds-to-save that people seem to have. The two axes are biological scope and temporal scope...Biolocial scope is the 'we' - the range of livings beings included as subjects in the definition of 'world'...Temporal scope is the range of time over which any act of world-saving seeks to preserve a historical consciousness associated with the biological scope. Worlds exist in time more than they do in space.
Constructing a 2x2 out of the biological and temporal scope dimensions we get the following view of worlds-to-save (blue), with representative savior types (green) who strive to save them.
Deep temporal scope combined with a narrow biological scope gives us civilizations for worlds, ethnocentrists as saviors. ..The End of the World is imagined in collapse-of-civilization terms.
Shallow temporal scope combined with a broad biological scope gives us technological modernity for a world, and cosmopolitans for saviors. A shallow temporal scope does not imply lack of historical imagination or curiosity. It merely means less of history being marked for saving...The End of the World is imagined in terms of rapid loss of scientific knowledge and technological capabilities.
Shallow temporal scope combined with narrow biological scope gives us a world defined by a stable landscape of modern nations...The End of the World is imagined in terms of descent to stateless anarchy. Failure is imagined as a Hobbesian condition of endemic (but not necessarily primitive or ignorant) warfare.
...the most fragile kind of world you can imagine trying to save: one with both a broad biological scope, and a deep temporal scope. This is the world as wildernesses...The End of the World is imagined in terms of ecological devastation and reduction of the planet to conditions incapable of sustaining most life. Failure is imagined in terms of forced extreme adaptation behaviors for the remnants of life. A rather unique version of this kind of world-saving impulse is one that contemplates species-suicide: viewing humans as the threat the world must be saved from. Saving the world in this vision requires eliminating humanity so the world can heal and recover.
I find myself primarily rooting for those in the technological modernity quadrant, and secondarily for those in the wildernesses quadrant. I find myself resisting the entire left half, but I’ve made my peace with their presence on the world-saving stage. I’m a cosmopolitan with Gaian tendencies.
I think, for a candidate world-to-save to be actually worth saving, its history must harbor inexhaustible mysteries. A world whose past is not mysterious has a future that is not interesting. If a world is exhausted of its historical mysteries, biological and/or temporal scope must be expanded to remystify and re-enchant it. This is one reason cosmopolitanism and the world-as-technological-modernity appeal to me. Its history is fundamentally mysterious in a way civilizational or national histories are not. And this is because the historical consciousness of technological modernity is, in my opinion, pre-civilizational in a way that is much closer to natural history than civilization ever gets.
For a cosmopolitan with Gaian tendencies, to save the modern world is to rewild and grow the global web of already slightly wild technological capabilities. Along with all the knowledge and resources — globally distributed in ways that cannot be cleanly factored across nations, civilizations, and other collective narcissisms — that is required to drive that web sustainably. And in the process, perhaps letting notions of civilization — including wishful notions of regulating and governing technology in ‘human centric’ ways — fall by the wayside if they lack the vitality and imagination to accommodate technological modernity

Friday, September 01, 2023

The fragility of artists’ reputations from 1795 to 2020

Zhang et al. do an interesting study using natural language processing to measure reputation over time:  

Significance

This study uses machine-learning techniques and a historical corpus to examine the evolution of artists’ reputations over time. Contrary to popular wisdom, we find that most artists’ reputations peak just before their death, and then start to decline. This decline is strongest for artists who were most popular during their lifetime. We show that artists’ reduced visibility and changes in the public’s aesthetic taste explain much of the posthumous reputation decline. This study highlights how social perception of historical figures can shift and emphasizes the vulnerability of human reputation. Methodologically, the study illustrates an application of natural language processing to measure reputation over time.
Abstract
This study explores the longevity of artistic reputation. We empirically examine whether artists are more- or less-venerated after their death. We construct a massive historical corpus spanning 1795 to 2020 and build separate word-embedding models for each five-year period to examine how the reputations of over 3,300 famous artists—including painters, architects, composers, musicians, and writers—evolve after their death. We find that most artists gain their highest reputation right before their death, after which it declines, losing nearly one SD every century. This posthumous decline applies to artists in all domains, includes those who died young or unexpectedly, and contradicts the popular view that artists’ reputations endure. Contrary to the Matthew effect, the reputational decline is the steepest for those who had the highest reputations while alive. Two mechanisms—artists’ reduced visibility and the public’s changing taste—are associated with much of the posthumous reputational decline. This study underscores the fragility of human reputation and shows how the collective memory of artists unfolds over time.

Wednesday, August 23, 2023

Why citizens vote away the democracies they claim to cherish.

Here is an interesting bit of research from Braley et al. reported in Nature Human Behaviour. Their abstract:
Around the world, citizens are voting away the democracies they claim to cherish. Here we present evidence that this behaviour is driven in part by the belief that their opponents will undermine democracy first. In an observational study (N = 1,973), we find that US partisans are willing to subvert democratic norms to the extent that they believe opposing partisans are willing to do the same. In experimental studies (N = 2,543, N = 1,848), we revealed to partisans that their opponents are more committed to democratic norms than they think. As a result, the partisans became more committed to upholding democratic norms themselves and less willing to vote for candidates who break these norms. These findings suggest that aspiring autocrats may instigate democratic backsliding by accusing their opponents of subverting democracy and that we can foster democratic stability by informing partisans about the other side’s commitment to democracy.

Monday, August 21, 2023

Never-Ending Stories - a survival tactic for uncertain times

I keep returning to clips of text that I abstracted from a recent piece by Venkatesh Rao. It gets more rich for me on each re-reading.  I like its points about purpose being inappropriate for uncertain times when the simplification offered by a protocol narrative is the best route to survival.  I post the clips here for my own future use, also thinking it might interest some MindBlog readers:

Never-Ending Stories

Marching beat-by-beat into a Purposeless infinite horizon

During periods of emergence from crisis conditions (both acute and chronic), when things seem overwhelming and impossible to deal with, you often hear advice along the following lines:

Take it one day at a time

Take it one step at a time

Sleep on it; morning is wiser than evening

Count to ten

Or even just breathe

All these formulas have one thing in common: they encourage you to surrender to the (presumed benevolent) logic of a situation at larger temporal scales by not thinking about it, and only attempt to exercise agency at the smallest possible temporal scales.

These formulas typically move you from a state of high-anxiety paralyzed inaction or chaotic, overwrought thrashing, to deliberate but highly myopic action. They implicitly assume that lack of emotional regulation is the biggest immediate problem and attempt to get you into a better-regulated state by shrinking time horizons. And that deliberate action (and more subtly, deliberate inaction) is better than either frozen inaction or overwrought thrashing.

There is no particular reason to expect taking things step-by-step to be a generally good idea. Studied, meditative myopia may be good for alleviating the subjective anxieties induced by a stressful situation, but there’s no reason to believe that the objective circumstances will yield to the accumulating power of “step-by-step” local deliberateness.

So why is this common advice? And is it good advice?

I’m going to develop an answer using a concept I call narrative protocols. This step-by-step formula is a typical invocation of such protocols. They seem to work better than we expect under certain high-stress conditions.

Protocol Narratives, Narrative Protocols

Loosely speaking, a protocol narrative is a never-ending story. I’ll define it more precisely as follows:

A protocol narrative is a never-ending story, without a clear capital-P Purpose, driven by a narrative protocol that can generate novelty over an indefinite horizon, without either a) jumping the shark, b) getting irretrievably stuck, or c) sinking below a threshold of minimum viable unpredictability.

A narrative protocol, for the purposes of this essay, is simply a storytelling formula that allows the current storytellers to continue the story one beat at a time, without a clear idea of how any of the larger narrative structure elements, like scenes, acts, or epic arcs, might evolve.

Note that many narrative models and techniques, including the best-known on
e, the Hero’s Journey, are not narrative protocols because they are designed to tell stories with clear termination behaviors. They are guaranteed-ending stories. They may be used to structure episodes within a protocol narrative, but by themselves are not narrative protocols.

This pair of definitions is not as abstract as it might seem. Many real-world fictional and non-fictional narratives approximate never-ending stories.

Long-running extended universe franchises (Star Wars, Star Trek, MCU), soap operas, South Park …, the Chinese national grand narrative, and perhaps the American one as well, are all approximate examples of protocol narratives driven by narrative protocols.

Protocols and Purpose

In ongoing discussions of protocols, several of us independently arrived at a conclusion that I articulate as protocols have functions but not purposes, by which I mean capital-P Purposes. Let’s distinguish two kinds of motive force in any narrative:

1. Functions are causal narrative mechanisms for solving particular problems in a predictable way. For example, one way to resolve a conflict between a hero and a villain is a fight. So a narrative technology that offers a set of tropes for fights has something like a fight(hero, villain) function that skilled authors or actors can invoke in specific media (text, screen, real-life politics). You might say that fight(hero, villain) transitions the narrative state causally from a state of unresolved conflict to resolved conflict. Functions need not be dramatic or supply entertainment though; they just need to move the action along, beat-by-beat, in a causal way.

2. Purposes are larger philosophical theses whose significance narratives may attest to, but do not (and cannot) exhaust. These theses may take the form of eternal conditions (“the eternal struggle between good and neutral”), animating paradoxes (“If God is good, why does He allow suffering to exist?”), or historicist, teleological terminal conditions. Not all stories have Purposes, but the claim is often made that the more elevated sort can and should. David Mamet, for instance, argues that good stories engage with and air eternal conflicts, drawing on their transformative power to drive events, without exhausting them.

In this scheme, narrative protocols only require a callable set of functions to be well-defined. They do not need, and generally do not have Purposes. Functions can sustain step-by-step behaviors all by themselves.

What’s more, not only are Purposes not necessary, they might even be actively harmful during periods of crisis, when arguably a bare-metal protocol narrative, comprising only functions, should exist.

There is, in fact, a tradeoff between having a protocol underlying a narrative, and an overarching Purpose guiding it from “above.”

The Protocol-Purpose Tradeoff

During periods of crisis, when larger logics may be uncomputable, and memory and identity integration over longer epochs may be intractable, it pays to shorten horizons until you get to computability and identity integrity — so long as the underlying assumptions that movement and deliberation are better than paralysis and thrashing hold.

The question remains though. When are such assumptions valid?

This is where the notion of a protocol enters the picture in a fuller way. There is protocols as in a short foreground behavior sequence (like step-by-step), but there is also the idea of a big-P Protocol, as in a systematic (and typically constructed rather than natural) reality in the background that has more lawful and benevolent characteristics than you may suspect.

Enacting protocol narratives is enacting trust in the a big-P Protocolized environment. You trust that the protocol narrative is much bigger than the visible tip of the iceberg that you functionally relate to.

As a simple illustration, on a general somewhat sparse random graph, trying to navigate by a greedy or myopic algorithm, one step at a time, to get to destination coordinates, is likely to get you trapped in a random cul-de-sac. But that same algorithm, on a regular rectangular grid, will not only get you to your destination, it will do so via a shortest path. You can trust the gridded reality more, given the same foreground behaviors.

In this example, the grid underlying the movement behavior is the big-P protocol that makes the behavior more effective than it would normally be. It serves as a substitute for the big-P purpose.

This also gives us a way to understand the promises, if not the realities, of big-P purposes of the sort made by religion, and why there is an essential tension and tradeoff here. 

To take a generic example, let’s say I tell you that in my religion, the
cosmos is an eternal struggle between Good and Evil, and that you should be Good in this life in order to enjoy a pleasurable heaven for eternity (terminal payoff) as well as to Do The Right Thing (eternal principle).

How would you use it?

This is not particularly useful in complex crisis situations where good and evil may be hard to disambiguate, and available action options may simply not have a meaningful moral valence.

The protocol directive of step-by-step is much less opinionated. It does not require you to act in a good way. It only requires you to take a step in a roughly right direction. And then another. And another. The actions do not even need to be justifiably rational with respect to particular consciously held premises. They just need to be deliberate.

*****

A sign that economic narratives are bare-bones protocol narratives is the fact that they tend to continue uninterrupted through crises that derail or kill other kinds of narratives. Through the Great Weirding and the Pandemic, we still got GDP, unemployment, inflation, and interest rate “stories.”

I bet that even if aliens landed tomorrow, even though the rest of us would be in a state of paralyzed inaction, unable to process or make sense of events, economists would continue to publish their numbers and argue about whether aliens landing is inflationary or deflationary. And at the microeconomic level, Matt Levine would probably write a reassuring Money Matters column explaining how to think about it all in terms of SEC regulations and force majeure contract clauses.

I like making fun of economists, but if you think about this, there is a profound and powerful narrative capability at work here. Strong protocol narratives can weather events that are unnarratable for all other kinds of narratives. Events that destroy high-Purpose religious and political narratives might cause no more than a ripple in strong protocol narratives.

So if you value longevity and non-termination, and you sense that times are tough, it makes sense to favor Protocols over Purposes.

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Step-by-Step is Hard-to-Kill

While economic narratives provide a good and clear class of examples of protocol narratives, they are not the only or even best examples.

The best examples are ones that show that a bare set of narrative functions is enough to sustain psychological life indefinitely. That surprisingly bleak narratives are nevertheless viable.

The very fact that we can even talk of “going through the motions” or feeling “empty and purposeless” when a governing narrative for a course of events is unsatisfying reveals that something else is in fact continuing, despite the lack of Purpose. Something that is computationally substantial and life-sustaining.

I recall a line from (I think) an old Desmond Bagley novel I read as a teenager, where a hero is trudging through a trackless desert. His inner monologue is going, one bloody foot after the next blood foot; one bloody step after the next bloody step.

Weird though it might seem, that’s actually a complete story. It works as a protocol narrative. There is a progressively summarizable logic to it, and a memory-ful evolving identity to it. If you’re an economist, it might even be a satisfying narrative, as good as “number go up.”

Protocol narratives only need functions to keep going.

They do not need Purposes, and generally are, to varying degrees, actively hostile to such constructs. It’s not just take it one day at a time, but an implied don’t think about weeks and months and the meaning of life; it might kill you.

While protocol narratives may tolerate elements of Purpose during normal times, they are especially hostile to them during crisis periods. If you think about it, step-by-step advancement of a narrative is a minimalist strategy. If a narrative can survive on a step-by-step type protocol alone, it is probably extraordinarily hard to kill, and doing more likely adds risk and fragility (hence the Protocol-Purpose tradeoff).

During periods of crisis, narrative protocols switch into a kind of triage mode where only step-by-step movement is allowed (somewhat like how, in debugging a computer program, stepping through code is a troubleshooting behavior). More abstract motive forces are deliberately suspended.

I like to think of the logic governing this as exposure therapy for life itself. In complex conditions, the most important thing to do is simply to choose life over and over, deliberately, step-by-step. To keep going is to choose life, and it is always the first order of business.

This is why, as I noted in the opening section, lack of emotional regulation is the first problem to address. Because in a crisis, if it is left unmanaged, it will turn into a retreat from life itself. As Churchill said, the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.

To reach for loftier abstractions than step-by-step in times of crisis is to retreat from life. Purpose is a life-threatening luxury you cannot afford in difficult times. But a narrative protocol will keep you going through even nearly unnarratable times. And even if it feels like merely going through empty motions, sometimes all it takes to choose life is to be slightly harder to kill.

Thursday, August 17, 2023

Born Rich

I want to pass on a few slightly edited clips from an interesting essay in The Dispatch by conservative writer Kevin Williamson that a friend pointed me to. And then I pass on the comment on Williamson's ideas offered by another friend: "Wow, this one’s a big gulp of the Kool-Aid. This thesis is patently untrue. As the one percent continues to grow in our current corporate low-tax, constantly crippled regulated business environment, the fallacy of this perspective grows along with it. This is exactly the thinking that book I recommended discusses (Oreskes and Conway: "How American business taught us to loathe government and love the free market.") Our democracy as it is currently functioning is not a Great Leveler.
One of the most distasteful aspects of our politics is the extent to which it is so obviously driven by envy, which is what 99 percent of that “privileged elite” talk ends up being about. But I suppose I am the wrong person to complain about that, because I was born rich, but I don't mean rich in the usual money sense.
Our intellectual and political life is dominated by a relatively narrow class of what we might call intellectually tall people, high-IQ people with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. And while a great many of them believe that inherited wealth is profoundly unfair, very few of them have any similar thoughts to share about the social role of inherited intelligence.
One of the hardest things to drill into the noggins of the American ruling class (and let’s not pretend that there isn’t one, even if it isn’t exactly what you might expect) is that there is no more merit in being born with certain economically valuable intellectual talents than there is in being born tall, or with curly hair—or white, for that matter. Inherited wealth is an enormous factor in the lives of a relatively small number of Americans and a more modest one in the lives of a larger number, but inherited brainpower is the unearned asset that matters most. We live in a very competitive, very connected world, one with very, very efficient labor markets...We have pretty effective tools (including standardized testing) that are very useful for reaching far, wide, and deep into the population to identify intellectual high-fliers and to direct them into educational and career paths that will give them the chance to make the most out of their lives. There probably is no better place in the world to be born poor and smart—but there is no more merit in being born smart than there is blame in being born poor.
The American “meritocracy” is based to a considerable extent on the generally unspoken proposition that intelligence is merit, and that smart people deserve their success in a special way. Our country is run by smart people, and the smart people in charge very much want to believe that they are where they are because of merit, because of the exemplary lives they have led, not because of some unearned hereditary trait that is the intellectual equivalent of a trust fund. The 1994 book "The Bell Curve" was an attempt to explore the paradox of the hereditary “meritocracy” in a serious way, and it was shouted down by—this was not coincidental—the class of people whose self-conception as a meritorious elite was most directly threatened by the authors’ hypothesis.
Understanding the privileges that go along with inherited intellectual ability as being in a moral sense very much like the privileges that go along with inherited wealth (or an inherited social-racial position or whatever privilege you like) opens up a radical and disruptive perspective on American public life—and draws attention to social situations that, even if understood to be unfair because of the role of hereditary advantage, are not open to resolution through redistributive taxes or affirmative action or anything like that. We aren’t going to mandate that half of the brain surgeons or theoretical physicists have below-average IQs.
Being a conservative, I believe that a healthy society necessarily contains a great deal of organic, authentic diversity. Being a realist, I also believe that this diversity comes with hierarchy. As Russell Kirk observed:
Conservatives pay attention to the principle of variety. They feel affection for the proliferating intricacy of long-established social institutions and modes of life, as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and deadening egalitarianism of radical systems. For the preservation of a healthy diversity in any civilization, there must survive orders and classes, differences in material condition, and many sorts of inequality. The only true forms of equality are equality at the Last Judgment and equality before a just court of law; all other attempts at levelling must lead, at best, to social stagnation. Society requires honest and able leadership; and if natural and institutional differences are destroyed, presently some tyrant or host of squalid oligarchs will create new forms of inequality.

Tuesday, August 15, 2023

Human History gets a rewrite.

I want to point to two articles I have enjoyed reading, both describing the recent book by Graeber and Wengrowa; “The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity.” The review by Deresiewicz is in The Atlantic Magazine, and The New Yorker Review " is by Lewis-Krause. Some clips from Deresiewicz:
The Dawn of Everything is written against the conventional account of human social history as first developed by Hobbes and Rousseau; elaborated by subsequent thinkers; popularized today by the likes of Jared Diamond, Yuval Noah Harari, and Steven Pinker; and accepted more or less universally...The story is linear (the stages are followed in order, with no going back), uniform (they are followed the same way everywhere), progressive (the stages are “stages” in the first place, leading from lower to higher, more primitive to more sophisticated), deterministic (development is driven by technology, not human choice), and teleological (the process culminates in us).
It is also, according to Graeber and Wengrow, completely wrong. Drawing on a wealth of recent archaeological discoveries that span the globe, as well as deep reading in often neglected historical sources (their bibliography runs to 63 pages), the two dismantle not only every element of the received account but also the assumptions that it rests on. Yes, we’ve had bands, tribes, cities, and states; agriculture, inequality, and bureaucracy, but what each of these were, how they developed, and how we got from one to the next—all this and more, the authors comprehensively rewrite. More important, they demolish the idea that human beings are passive objects of material forces, moving helplessly along a technological conveyor belt that takes us from the Serengeti to the DMV. We’ve had choices, they show, and we’ve made them. Graeber and Wengrow offer a history of the past 30,000 years that is not only wildly different from anything we’re used to, but also far more interesting: textured, surprising, paradoxical, inspiring.
Is “civilization” worth it, the authors want to know, if civilization—ancient Egypt, the Aztecs, imperial Rome, the modern regime of bureaucratic capitalism enforced by state violence—means the loss of what they see as our three basic freedoms: the freedom to disobey, the freedom to go somewhere else, and the freedom to create new social arrangements? Or does civilization rather mean “mutual aid, social co-operation, civic activism, hospitality [and] simply caring for others”?
These are questions that Graeber, a committed anarchist—an exponent not of anarchy but of anarchism, the idea that people can get along perfectly well without governments—asked throughout his career. The Dawn of Everything is framed by an account of what the authors call the “indigenous critique.” In a remarkable chapter, they describe the encounter between early French arrivals in North America, primarily Jesuit missionaries, and a series of Native intellectuals—individuals who had inherited a long tradition of political conflict and debate and who had thought deeply and spoke incisively on such matters as “generosity, sociability, material wealth, crime, punishment and liberty.”
The Indigenous critique, as articulated by these figures in conversation with their French interlocutors, amounted to a wholesale condemnation of French—and, by extension, European—society: its incessant competition, its paucity of kindness and mutual care, its religious dogmatism and irrationalism, and most of all, its horrific inequality and lack of freedom. The authors persuasively argue that Indigenous ideas, carried back and publicized in Europe, went on to inspire the Enlightenment (the ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy, they note, had theretofore been all but absent from the Western philosophical tradition). They go further, making the case that the conventional account of human history as a saga of material progress was developed in reaction to the Indigenous critique in order to salvage the honor of the West. We’re richer, went the logic, so we’re better. The authors ask us to rethink what better might actually mean.