Is our microbiome manipulating us to look out for itself?

Links between our gut and our brain, especially via the vagus nerve, can regulate stress disorders such as depression and anxiety. Growing evidence shows that the microbes in our gut can influence this by releasing various neurotransmitters (like dopamine and serotonin) near the rich bed of nerve endings that surround the gut. A lactobacillus found in Yoghurt can alter the GABA inhibitory neurotransmitter system and reduce stress induced behaviors in mice, an effect that requires the intact vagus nerve. I would suggest you have a look at Zimmer's summary of work suggesting that gut bacteria, in addition to helping to break down our food, fight off infections and nurture our immune system, might be a puppet master altering our food preferences to benefit themselves. In mice, bacteria can alter levels of hormones that govern appetite. Possibly they could influence various food cravings in humans.

Brain and behavioral correlates of compassion training.

Davidson and colleagues at the University of Wisconsin have

...investigated whether short-term compassion training would enhance altruistic behavior toward a victim encountered outside of the training context. Altruistic behavior was assessed using the redistribution game, a novel economic decision-making task that models both unfair treatment of a victim and costly redistribution of funds to the victim.

Training consisted of practicing either compassion or reappraisal using guided audio instructions (via the Internet or compact disc) for 30 min per day for 2 weeks. Compassion trainees practiced cultivating feelings of compassion for different targets (a loved one, the self, a stranger, and a difficult person), and reappraisal trainees practiced reinterpreting personally stressful events to decrease negative affect. [note: in reappraisal training the psychological goal is self-focused (to decrease one’s own suffering) rather than other-focused (to decrease other people’s suffering through compassion).]

Here is their abstract:

Compassion is a key motivator of altruistic behavior, but little is known about individuals’ capacity to cultivate compassion through training. We examined whether compassion may be systematically trained by testing whether (a) short-term compassion training increases altruistic behavior and (b) individual differences in altruism are associated with training-induced changes in neural responses to suffering. In healthy adults, we found that compassion training increased altruistic redistribution of funds to a victim encountered outside of the training context. Furthermore, increased altruistic behavior after compassion training was associated with altered activation in brain regions implicated in social cognition and emotion regulation, including the inferior parietal cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and in DLPFC connectivity with the nucleus accumbens. These results suggest that compassion can be cultivated with training and that greater altruistic behavior may emerge from increased engagement of neural systems implicated in understanding the suffering of other people, executive and emotional control, and reward processing.

Spooky and awesome technology

Recent issues of Science Magazine have amazing reports of technology advances: a brain-like spiking-neuron integrated circuit on a 5.4 billion transistor chip with 4096 neurosynaptic cores (Markoff does a nice summary in the NYTimes) - said to be as fundamental an advance as the invention of the first transistor;  a self assembling robot that forms itself from a flat sheet (see review by Chang); and, if that's not enough for you, what about self-assembling hordes of mini robots.  (How long will it be before these treats become parts of weapons systems that find their way into the hands of tribal jihadists, like the current U.S. high-tech weaponry being used by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria?).

I won't reproduce the article abstracts here, but pass on three visuals:

First the new "True North" computer chip:

Second, a video of the self assembling robot.

   


And finally, Programmable self-assembly in a thousand-robot swarm.

More on brain games and training - and reversing cognitive decline in aging.

Yesterday I got into playing again with a subscription to the online brain training games developed by Michael Merzenich and his colleagues that I purchased about a year ago. (Merzenich was one of the researchers to find that the adult brain was plastic, could re-wire itself). I have engaged these brain games episodically, but being a lazy person not much motivated by their efforts to urge users on, have each time drifted away. After about twenty minutes of getting into the various games I can feel what must be the brain equivalent of muscle fatigue. An almost-headache, a growing sense of effort, and finally a beginning to tire, slow down and falter. There is no question, however, about the beneficial effects - which I can feel for many days afterwards - of the exercises on my attention, brain speed, short term memory. Several studies have now shown that brain changes induced by training exercises like these can persist for months or years.

I thought I would pass on links to several articles in this area that have been languishing for a long time in my queue of potential post items.

Murphy reviews several studies of the use of vision training games in athletics.

Medeiros does an article in Wired Magazine on Merzenich.

And, Abbott summarizes Gazzaley's work on a game (NeuroRacer) that reverses age-related cognitive decline.

This game is still considered a research tool, and is not released for general use, but the Optic Flow: Navigation game on the http://www.brainhq.com/ site has similar features (simulated highway driving, noting and evaluating moving signs and obstacles).

Here is the abstract from the paper of Gazzaley and collaborators:

Cognitive control is defined by a set of neural processes that allow us to interact with our complex environment in a goal-directed manner. Humans regularly challenge these control processes when attempting to simultaneously accomplish multiple goals (multitasking), generating interference as the result of fundamental information processing limitations. It is clear that multitasking behaviour has become ubiquitous in today’s technologically dense world, and substantial evidence has accrued regarding multitasking difficulties and cognitive control deficits in our ageing population. Here we show that multitasking performance, as assessed with a custom-designed three-dimensional video game (NeuroRacer), exhibits a linear age-related decline from 20 to 79 years of age. By playing an adaptive version of NeuroRacer in multitasking training mode, older adults (60 to 85 years old) reduced multitasking costs compared to both an active control group and a no-contact control group, attaining levels beyond those achieved by untrained 20-year-old participants, with gains persisting for 6 months. Furthermore, age-related deficits in neural signatures of cognitive control, as measured with electroencephalography, were remediated by multitasking training (enhanced midline frontal theta power and frontal–posterior theta coherence). Critically, this training resulted in performance benefits that extended to untrained cognitive control abilities (enhanced sustained attention and working memory), with an increase in midline frontal theta power predicting the training-induced boost in sustained attention and preservation of multitasking improvement 6 months later. These findings highlight the robust plasticity of the prefrontal cognitive control system in the ageing brain, and provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, of how a custom-designed video game can be used to assess cognitive abilities across the lifespan, evaluate underlying neural mechanisms, and serve as a powerful tool for cognitive enhancement.

How chronic pain saps our motivations and desires - the mechanism.

Fields gives a nice summary of work by Schwartz et al., who find a detailed synaptic mechanism for how chronic pain saps our motivations and desires. I pass on the article's abstract and a summary graphic by Schwartz.

Several symptoms associated with chronic pain, including fatigue and depression, are characterized by reduced motivation to initiate or complete goal-directed tasks. However, it is unknown whether maladaptive modifications in neural circuits that regulate motivation occur during chronic pain. Here, we demonstrate that the decreased motivation elicited in mice by two different models of chronic pain requires a galanin receptor 1–triggered depression of excitatory synaptic transmission in indirect pathway nucleus accumbens medium spiny neurons. These results demonstrate a previously unknown pathological adaption in a key node of motivational neural circuitry that is required for one of the major sequela of chronic pain states and syndromes.

Glutamate inputs excite nucleus accumbens medium spiny neurons. Chronic pain reduces AMPA receptor function in the DADR2-expressing class of these neurons, thereby reducing their activation by glutamate input. This decreases the motivation to work for a food reward.

The habenula (?) does a tally of our negative outcomes.

Impress your friends that you know the name of a brain region that they haven't heard of before! Lawson et al., in yet another publication that includes Raymond Dolan as one its authors, find that the habenula encodes the dynamically changing negative motivational value of stimuli that predict primary punishments. One suggestion is that an overactive habenula might cause the feelings of impending doom and low motivation common in people with depression.

Learning what to approach, and what to avoid, involves assigning value to environmental cues that predict positive and negative events. Studies in animals indicate that the lateral habenula encodes the previously learned negative motivational value of stimuli. However, involvement of the habenula in dynamic trial-by-trial aversive learning has not been assessed, and the functional role of this structure in humans remains poorly characterized, in part, due to its small size. Using high-resolution functional neuroimaging and computational modeling of reinforcement learning, we demonstrate positive habenula responses to the dynamically changing values of cues signaling painful electric shocks, which predict behavioral suppression of responses to those cues across individuals. By contrast, negative habenula responses to monetary reward cue values predict behavioral invigoration. Our findings show that the habenula plays a key role in an online aversive learning system and in generating associated motivated behavior in humans.

In learning, too much of a good thing can be bad.

Many contemporary elementary school classrooms have walls that are covered with varied and interesting displays that are not relevant to ongoing instruction (very unlike the austere and bare walls shown in photographs of the 1860 one room schoolhouse walls that now form the living room walls of my home on Twin Valley road in Middleton, WI.) Fisher et al. make the point that rich and distracting environments can detract from focused learning.

A large body of evidence supports the importance of focused attention for encoding and task performance. Yet young children with immature regulation of focused attention are often placed in elementary-school classrooms containing many displays that are not relevant to ongoing instruction. We investigated whether such displays can affect children’s ability to maintain focused attention during instruction and to learn the lesson content. We placed kindergarten children in a laboratory classroom for six introductory science lessons, and we experimentally manipulated the visual environment in the classroom. Children were more distracted by the visual environment, spent more time off task, and demonstrated smaller learning gains when the walls were highly decorated than when the decorations were removed.

Varieties of introspection.

I disagree with David Brooks’ opinions much of the time, but I’m impressed with what a polymath he is. His Op-Ed piece on healthy versus unhealthy introspection is a case in point:

...there seems to be a paradox at the heart of introspection. The self is something that can be seen more accurately from a distance than from close up. The more you can yank yourself away from your own intimacy with yourself, the more reliable your self-awareness is likely to be...When people examine themselves from too close, they often end up ruminating or oversimplifying...have repetitive thoughts, but don’t take action. Depressed ruminators end up making themselves more depressed.

We are better self-perceivers if we can create distance and see the general contours of our emergent system selves — rather than trying to unpack constituent parts. This can be done in several ways.

First, you can distance yourself by time. ...people who write about trauma later on can place a broader perspective on things. Their lives are improved by the exercise.

Second, we can achieve distance from self through language. ..it’s smart, when trying to counsel yourself, to pretend you are somebody else. This can be done a bit even by thinking of yourself in the third person...people who view themselves from a self-distanced perspective are better at adaptive self-reflection than people who view themselves from a self-immersed perspective.

Finally, there is narrative. ..We should see ourselves as literary critics, putting each incident in the perspective of a longer life story. The narrative form is a more supple way of understanding human processes, even unconscious ones, than rationalistic analysis.

Maturity is moving from the close-up to the landscape, focusing less on your own supposed strengths and weaknesses and more on the sea of empathy in which you swim, which is the medium necessary for understanding others, one’s self, and survival.

An opinion due to social conformity lasts only a few days.

Huang et al. do a study on 22 South China Normal University students in which they evaluated the attractiveness of a series of neutral faces with and without knowing other students' opinions of them.

When people are faced with opinions different from their own, they often revise their own opinions to match those held by other people. This is known as the social-conformity effect. Although the immediate impact of social influence on people’s decision making is well established, it is unclear whether this reflects a transient capitulation to public opinion or a more enduring change in privately held views. In an experiment using a facial-attractiveness rating task, we asked participants to rate each face; after providing their rating, they were informed of the rating given by a peer group. They then rerated the same faces after 1, 3, or 7 days or 3 months. Results show that individuals’ initial judgments are altered by the differing opinions of other people for no more than 3 days. Our findings suggest that because the social-conformity effect lasts several days, it reflects a short-term change in privately held views rather than a transient public compliance.

Motivation not improved by multiple motives.

Wrzesniewski et al. do an interesting study of 11,320 West Point cadets over a period of ten years.

Although people often assume that multiple motives for doing something will be more powerful and effective than a single motive, research suggests that different types of motives for the same action sometimes compete. More specifically, research suggests that instrumental motives, which are extrinsic to the activities at hand, can weaken internal motives, which are intrinsic to the activities at hand. We tested whether holding both instrumental and internal motives yields negative outcomes in a field context in which various motives occur naturally and long-term educational and career outcomes are at stake. We assessed the impact of the motives of over 10,000 West Point cadets over the period of a decade on whether they would become commissioned officers, extend their officer service beyond the minimum required period, and be selected for early career promotions. For each outcome, motivation internal to military service itself predicted positive outcomes; a relationship that was negatively affected when instrumental motives were also in evidence. These results suggest that holding multiple motives damages persistence and performance in educational and occupational contexts over long periods of time.

Here is a bit more detail from the start of the results section:

Across two different survey measures administered by the institution at the start of their first year, cadets indicated how much each of a set of reasons offered represented their reasons for attending West Point, which allowed them to endorse any number of reasons at various levels of strength (response scales for the two measures ranged from very important to not important on a 1–3 Likert-type scale; and very positive to very negative on a 1–5 Likert-type scale). Reasons offered in the survey ranged from the prospect of getting a good job (instrumental), to economic necessity (cadets do not pay tuition), to a desire to be an Army officer (internal). Of the various reasons offered, two types were of key interest: reasons indicating an internal desire to become an Army officer and reasons indicating an instrumental desire to gain eventual outcomes associated with attending West Point. The data are archival; thus, none of the items in the surveys completed by cadets perfectly captured the distinction between “internal” and “instrumental” motives. For example, there were no items intended to capture a “pure” internal motive, defined to mean that the activity of becoming a West Point cadet was a meaningful and valuable end in itself (3). However, this motive is “internal” in the sense that the desire to be an Army officer requires that one do the things that Army officers do. In this way, it is akin to “being a soldier” (internal) rather than “getting a good job” (instrumental)....A total of 31 reasons appeared in the surveys and were subjected to exploratory factor analysis...

How much do our genes influence our political beliefs?

One of MindBlog’s subject threads has been noting articles that examine the correlation between our genetic constitution and our political behaviors. Thus I point to a recent article by Thomas Edsall that notes work in this controversial field by Ludeke et al. who:

...write that “authoritarianism, religiousness and conservatism,” which they call the “traditional moral values triad,” are “substantially influenced by genetic factors.” — all three traits are reflections of “a single, underlying tendency,” previously described in one word by Bouchard in a 2006 paper as “traditionalism.” Traditionalists in this sense are defined as “having strict moral standards and child-rearing practices, valuing conventional propriety and reputation, opposing rebelliousness and selfish disregard of others, and valuing religious institutions and practices.”

From this perspective, the Democratic Party — supportive of abortion rights, same-sex marriage and the primacy of self-expressive individualism over obligation to family — is irreconcilably alien to a segment of the electorate. And the same is true from the opposite viewpoint: a Republican Party committed to right-to-life policies, to a belief that marriage must be between a man and a woman, and to family obligation over self-actualization, is profoundly unacceptable to many on the left.

Ludeke et al. studied a sample of identical (monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic) twins who were separated from each other early in life. They assessed their adult social, political, and social attitudes, finding that they represented a single construct that was heritable and similar to a traditionalism measure. Their abstract:

Social attitudes, political attitudes and religiousness are highly inter-correlated. Furthermore, each is substantially influenced by genetic factors. Koenig and Bouchard (2006) hypothesized that these three areas (which they termed the Traditional Moral Values Triad) each derive from an underlying latent trait concerning the tendency to obey traditional authorities. We tested this hypothesis with data from a sample of twins raised in different homes. We assessed social attitudes with Altemeyer’s (1988) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, political attitudes with Wilson and Patterson’s (1968) Conservatism scale, and religiousness with Wiggins’ (1966) Religious Fundamentalism scale. The best-fitting model identified the three TMVT domains as different manifestations of a single latent and significantly heritable factor. Further, the genetic and environmental bases for this factor overlapped heavily with those for the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire Traditionalism scale, supporting the conception of traditionalism as the latent factor represented by the three scales in contemporary Western societies.

Anger as the most easily spread emotion.

Teddy Wayne does an essay on how anger is the emotion that spreads the most easily over social media. Some clips:

A 2013 study, from Beihang University in Beijing, of Weibo, a Twitter-like site, found that anger is the emotion that spreads the most easily over social media. Joy came in a distant second. The main difference, said Ryan Martin, a psychology professor at the University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, who studies anger, is that although we tend to share the happiness only of people we are close to, we are willing to join in the rage of strangers. As the study suggests, outrage is lavishly rewarded on social media, whether through supportive comments, retweets or Facebook likes. People prone to Internet outrage are looking for validation, Professor Martin said. “They want to hear that others share it,” he said, “because they feel they’re vindicated and a little less lonely and isolated in their belief.”

...outrage carries a different flavor from pure anger; it suggests an affront to one’s value system as opposed to seething, Hulk-like fury. So whereas a venomous insult from an anonymous commenter simply seeks to tear down another person or institution, an outraged Twitter post from an identified account calls attention to the user’s own probity. By throwing 140-character stones from our Google Glass houses, we preserve our belief (or delusion) that we are morally superior to those who have offended us.

Perhaps the real problem, Professor Martin suggested, isn’t our rage but our rashness, and its relationship to our easily accessible devices. The Internet exacerbates impulse-control problems. You get mad, and you can tell the world about it in moments before you’ve had a chance to calm down and think things through.

Brain noise? Insomnia? Try A.S.M.R.

Fairyington does an interesting piece on a phenomenon called autonomous sensory meridian response (A.S.M.R.), which is felt as a mild calming tingling sensation that travels over the scalp or other part of the body in response to some kinds of subtle repetitive visual, auditory, or smell stimulation (rustling pages, whispering; tapping, scratching, etc.). The article contains numerous links to YouTube sites devoted to this effect. Some clips:

Carl W. Bazil, a sleep disorders specialist at Columbia University, says A.S.M.R. videos may provide novel ways to switch off our brains...“People who have insomnia are in a hyper state of arousal,” he said. “Behavioral treatments — guided imagery, progressive relaxation, hypnosis and meditation — are meant to try to trick your unconscious into doing what you want it to do. A.S.M.R. videos seem to be a variation on finding ways to shut your brain down.”

Bryson Lochte, a post-baccalaureate fellow at the National Institute on Drug Abuse who looked into A.S.M.R. for his senior thesis as a neuroscience major at Dartmouth College last year, has submitted his paper for publication in a scientific journal. Mr. Lochte said, “We focused on those areas in the brain associated with motivation, emotion and arousal to probe the effect A.S.M.R. has on the ‘reward system’ — the neural structures that trigger a dopamine surge amid pleasing reinforcements, like food or sex.

He compared A.S.M.R. to another idiosyncratic but well-studied sensation called musical frisson, which provokes a thrilling ripple of chills or goose bumps (technically termed piloerection) over one’s body in emotional response to music. Mathias Benedek, a research assistant at the University of Graz in Austria who co-authored two studies on emotion-provoked piloerection, says A.S.M.R. may be a softer, quieter version of the same phenomenon. “Frisson may simply be a stronger, full-blown response,” he said. And like A.S.M.R., the melodies that ignite frisson in one person may not in another.

Robert J. Zatorre, a professor of neuroscience at the Montreal Neurological Institute and Hospital at McGill University who has also studied musical frisson, said that “the upshot of my paper is that pleasurable music elicits dopamine activity in the striatum, which is a key component of the reward system” in the brain. Writing in The New York Times last year, in an article titled “Why Music Makes Our Brain Sing,” he notes, “What may be most interesting here is when this neurotransmitter is released: not only when the music rises to a peak emotional moment, but also several seconds before, during what we might call the anticipation phase.”

Perhaps the everyday experiences that A.S.M.R. videos capture — whispering, crinkling, opening and closing of boxes — evoke similar anticipatory mechanisms, sparking memories of past pleasures that we anticipate and relive each time we watch and listen.

MindBlog gets married.

Deric Bownds and his partner of 25 years, Len Walker, having brunch at Palmer House in Chicago after getting married at the Cook County Courthouse during a visit with friends Mark Weber and Roy Wesley.

Faith and ideology trump reason...

Sigh...sorry to spread such pessimistic material, but I pass on two items on the persistence of faith or ideology over reason. Nyhan describes a number of studies, including one by Kahan, who finds that the divide over belief in evolution between more and less religious people is wider among people who otherwise show familiarity with math and science, which suggests that the problem isn’t a lack of information. And, Paul Krugman issues another installment in his railing about the inflation delusions clung to by conservative economists and politicans.

Brain activity that reflects positive and negative emotion.

Knutson et al. at Stanford note a correlation between self reported positive and negative arousal and fMRI measurement of brain activity in the nucleus accumbens and anterior insula (if you go to Google images and enter these terms you can see the locations of these regions in brain). Their abstract:

Neuroimaging findings are often interpreted in terms of affective experience, but researchers disagree about the advisability or even possibility of such inferences, and few frameworks explicitly link these levels of analysis. Here, we suggest that the spatial and temporal resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data could support inferences about affective states. Specifically, we propose that fMRI nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activity is associated with positive arousal, whereas a combination of anterior insula activity and NAcc activity is associated with negative arousal. This framework implies quantifiable and testable inferences about affect from fMRI data, which may ultimately inform predictions about approach and avoidance behavior.

And a figure from their paper:

Meta-analytic results for activity in nucleus accumbens (NAcc; white circles) and anterior insula (black circles) during incentive anticipation. Activation likelihood estimate maps adapted from Bartra et al.  - who also present a list of regions correlating with affect -  superimposed onto the affective circumplex [from right to left: positive minus negative subjective value (SV), positive subjective value, positive plus negative subjective value, and negative subjective value]

Brain correlates of behaviors in market bubbles.

Interesting...from Smith et al. a visualization of the part of our brains that seem to be saying "go for it" during a market bubble (and making less money) and another region that is saying "Whoa..." (whose activity is more prominent in successful traders who pull out of the market before the crash.)

Groups of humans routinely misassign value to complex future events, especially in settings involving the exchange of resources. If properly structured, experimental markets can act as excellent probes of human group-level valuation mechanisms during pathological overvaluations—price bubbles. The connection between the behavioral and neural underpinnings of such phenomena has been absent, in part due to a lack of enabling technology. We used a multisubject functional MRI paradigm to measure neural activity in human subjects participating in experimental asset markets in which endogenous price bubbles formed and crashed. Although many ideas exist about how and why such bubbles may form and how to identify them, our experiment provided a window on the connection between neural responses and behavioral acts (buying and selling) that created the bubbles. We show that aggregate neural activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) tracks the price bubble and that NAcc activity aggregated within a market predicts future price changes and crashes. Furthermore, the lowest-earning subjects express a stronger tendency to buy as a function of measured NAcc activity. Conversely, we report a signal in the anterior insular cortex in the highest earners that precedes the impending price peak, is associated with a higher propensity to sell in high earners, and that may represent a neural early warning signal in these subjects. Such markets could be a model system to understand neural and behavior mechanisms in other settings where emergent group-level activity exhibits mistaken belief or valuation.

A intriguing take on consciousness as a perceptual construct.

A recent review by Aaron Schurger in Science Magazine pointed me to Michael Graziano's 2013 book "Consciousness and the Social Brain", which I immediately downloaded, read, and abstracted. Very engaging and clear writing (although I am dumbfounded that he makes no reference to Thomas Metzinger's work and 'ego tunnel' model, which has common elements with his own.) In Graziano's theory awareness is information, the brain's simplified, schematic model of the complicated, data-handling process of attention. A brain can use the construct of awareness to model its own attentional state or to model someone else’s attentional state. An extract from Schurger's review:

In Consciousness and the Social Brain, Michael Graziano argues that consciousness is a perceptual construct—the brain attributes it to other people in much the same way that the brain attributes speech to the ventriloquist's puppet. To clarify, imagine being greeted by a very lifelike android version of your best friend with a prerecorded behavioral program that had you genuinely fooled for a few minutes. From your perspective, for those minutes, the android was endowed with consciousness. Thus there need be no truth or falsity to the statement “My friend standing before me is conscious.” Your brain decides that the android–best friend standing in front of you is conscious, and that is what you perceive to be true.

According to Graziano's “attention schema” theory, our own consciousness is also a perceptual construct—a unique one that emerges when the brain applies the same perceptual attribution recursively to itself. We attribute consciousness to others as part of our perceptual model of what they are paying attention to (an inference particularly useful for predicting their behavior). This model describes the process of attention as a mysterious something extra in the brains of beings that are selectively processing information that guides their behavior. When the brain applies the model to itself, “I” become endowed with this extra something as well—although, as with the android, it was never there in the first place.

According to the theory, consciousness is to attention what the body schema is to the body: it is the brain's perceptual description of its own process of attention. The two phenomena are thus locked “in a positive feedback loop,” which explains the tight connection between attention and consciousness. In essence, consciousness is a descriptive story about a real physical phenomenon (attention). The ink in which the story is written (neural activity) is real, and the physical phenomenon that the story is “about” (attention) is real. But, like the talking puppet, the story itself need not be real. We say that we have consciousness, and that it seems irreducible to physical phenomena, because that is how the brain describes the process of attention (in ourselves and in others): as something ineffable.

I'll also give you a clip from my abstracting of the book:

The heart of the theory is that awareness is a schematized, descriptive model of attention. The model is not perfectly accurate, but it is good enough to be useful. It is a rich information set, as rich as a sensory representation. It can be bound to a representation of an object as though it were another sensory attribute like color or motion….the purpose of a model in the brain is to be useful in interacting with the world, not to be accurate.

The body schema and the attention schema may share more than a formal similarity. They may partially overlap. The body schema is an internal model— an organized set of information that represents the shape, structure, and movement of the body, that distinguishes between objects belonging to the body and objects that are foreign.

In the present theory, the attention schema is similar to the body schema. Rather than representing one’s physical body, it models a different aspect of oneself, also a complex dynamical system, the process of attention— the process by which some signals in the brain become enhanced at the expense of others. It is a predictive model of attention, its dynamics, its essential meaning, its potential impact on behavior, what it can and can’t do, what affects it, and how. It is a simulation. The quirky way that attention shifts from place to place, from item to item, its fluctuating intensity, its spatial and temporal dynamics— all of these aspects are incorporated into the model.

Video game puzzle that improves executive function.

Maybe you don't have to pay brainhq.com or luminosity.com a monthly fee for brain exercises to improve your brain's executive functions. An iOS or Android App costing three dollars might do the job. Oei and Patterson make the interesting observation that executive function (making decision in rapidly changing circumstances) can be improved 30% by a video game (Cut the Rope) that requires physics-based puzzle solving but not by an action video game, a fast paced arcade game, or a real-time strategy game. Tests of executive function were administered before and a week after the game training. Their abstract:

Recent research suggests a causal link between action video game playing and enhanced attention and visual-perceptual skills. In contrast, evidence linking action video games and enhanced executive function is equivocal. We investigated whether action and non-action video games enhance executive function. Fifty-five inexperienced video game players played one of four different games: an action video game (Modern Combat), a physics-based puzzle game (Cut the Rope), a real-time strategy game (Starfront Collision), and a fast paced arcade game (Fruit Ninja) for 20 h. Three pre and post training tests of executive function were administered: a random task switching, a flanker, and a response inhibition task (Go/No-go). Only the group that trained on the physics-based puzzle game significantly improved in all three tasks relative to the pre-test. No training-related improvements were seen in other groups. These results suggest that playing a complex puzzle game that demands strategizing, reframing, and planning improves several aspects of executive function.

Life purpose, longevity, and Alzheimers disease.

From Hill and Turiano:

Having a purpose in life has been cited consistently as an indicator of healthy aging for several reasons, including its potential for reducing mortality risk. In the current study, we sought to extend previous findings by examining whether purpose in life promotes longevity across the adult years, using data from the longitudinal Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) sample. Proportional-hazards models demonstrated that purposeful individuals lived longer than their counterparts did during the 14 years after the baseline assessment, even when controlling for other markers of psychological and affective well-being. Moreover, these longevity benefits did not appear to be conditional on the participants’ age, how long they lived during the follow-up period, or whether they had retired from the workforce. In other words, having a purpose in life appears to widely buffer against mortality risk across the adult years.

(MIDUS refers to a longitudinal study of health and well-being that began in 1994–1995. 7,108 participants were recruited from a nationally representative, random-digit-dialing sample of noninstitutionalized adults between the ages of 20 and 75 (mean age = 46.92 years, SD = 12.94)).

An article by Span points to other studies following almost 1,000 people (age 80, on average) for up to seven years, finding that those with high purpose scores were 2.4 times more likely to remain free of Alzheimer’s than those with low scores and also less likely to develop mild cognitive impairment, often a precursor...In a subset of 246 people who died, autopsies found that many of the purposeful subjects also showed the distinctive markers of Alzheimer’s, suggesting that even for people developing the plaques and tangles in their brains, having purpose in life allows them to tolerate them and still maintain their cognition...Another study, of 1,238 people followed for up to five years (average age: 78)found that those with high purpose had roughly half the mortality rate of those with low purpose.