Showing posts with label futures. Show all posts
Showing posts with label futures. Show all posts

Friday, July 04, 2008

MRI of mental time travel.

Arzy et al. make the interesting observation that one's imagined self location influences the neural activity related to mental time travel. Slightly edited clips from the article:

A fundamental characteristic of human conscious experience is the ability to not only experience the present moment but also to recall the past and predict the future, or to "travel" back and forth in time, a facility that is called "mental time travel" (MTT)...Converging evidence from recent memory research suggests that re-experiencing and pre-experiencing an event rely on similar neural mechanisms. Similar strategies and the same brain regions are found to be used in imagining past and future events, as future predictions may be based on past memories... when changing the location of one's self in time to past or future, one does not only recall and predict, but one also changes one's mental egocentric perspective on life events. Moreover, from these new self-locations in time, other life events might be regarded differently with respect to their relations to past or future. Thus, when imagining oneself as 10 years younger, last year's events are in the future (relative future) in relation to the initially imagined self-location in time, and vice versa (relative past).
Since earlier studies had shown behavioral and electrophysiological differences between judgments about one's own body while taken from one's actual spatial self-location versus different imagined self-locations, and given evidence that shared mechanisms process time and space in the brain, the authors developed a behavioral paradigm to determine if differences are found not only between different self-locations in time (past, now, and future), but also while imagining events in the relative past or the relative future. They followed neural correlates of MTT using behavioral measures, evoked potential (EP) mapping, and electrical neuroimaging in healthy adult participants.


Stimuli and procedure. The three different self-locations in time (past, now, and future) are shown. Participants were asked to mentally imagine themselves in one of these self-locations, and from these self-locations to judge whether different self or nonself events (e.g., top row) already happened (relative past, darker colors) or are yet to happen (relative future, lighter colors).
Their work confirmed that:
...that MTT is composed of two different cognitive processes: absolute MTT, which is the location of the self to different points in time (past, present, or future), and relative MTT, which is the location of one's self with respect to the experienced event (relative past and relative future). These processes recruit a network of brain areas in distinct time periods including the occipitotemporal, temporoparietal, and anteromedial temporal cortices. Our findings suggest that in addition to autobiographical memory processes, the cognitive mechanisms of MTT also involve mental imagery and self-location, and that relative MTT, but not absolute MTT, is more strongly directed to future prediction than to past recollection.

Generators of MTT map are localized to the right temporoparietal, occipitotemporal, and left anteromedial temporal cortices.

Monday, June 09, 2008

The futurist: machines as smart as ourselves

John Tierney does a nice write up of the debate over the ideas of futurist Ray Kurzweil. (I've always thought that Kurzweil was simple proof of the proposition that if you propose any 10 crazy things, one of them will turn out to be right. People remember the correct prophesy, and forget the mistakes.) Still.... the guy has been right on a number of times. Here is part of the discussion of our cognitive/emotional repertoire being bested by machines ( (possibly piggybacked onto our biological hardware). This event is referred to as "the singularity." Kurzweil proposes that:

..by the 2020s we’ll be adding computers to our brains and building machines as smart as ourselves...This serene confidence is not shared by neuroscientists like Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, who discussed future brains with Dr. Kurzweil at the festival. It might be possible to create a thinking, empathetic machine, Dr. Ramachandran said, but it might prove too difficult to reverse-engineer the brain’s circuitry because it evolved so haphazardly...“My colleague Francis Crick used to say that God is a hacker, not an engineer,” Dr. Ramachandran said. “You can do reverse engineering, but you can’t do reverse hacking.”...Dr. Kurzweil’s predictions come under intense scrutiny in the engineering magazine IEEE Spectrum, which devotes its current issue to the Singularity. Some of the experts writing in the issue endorse Dr. Kurzweil’s belief that conscious, intelligent beings can be created, but most think it will take more than a few decades....He is accustomed to this sort of pessimism and readily acknowledges how complicated the brain is. But if experts in neurology and artificial intelligence (or solar energy or medicine) don’t buy his optimistic predictions, he says, that’s because exponential upward curves are so deceptively gradual at first.

“Scientists imagine they’ll keep working at the present pace,” he told me after his speech. “They make linear extrapolations from the past. When it took years to sequence the first 1 percent of the human genome, they worried they’d never finish, but they were right on schedule for an exponential curve. If you reach 1 percent and keep doubling your growth every year, you’ll hit 100 percent in just seven years.”

Dr. Kurzweil is so confident in these curves that he has made a $10,000 bet with Mitch Kapor, the creator of Lotus software. By 2029, Dr. Kurzweil wagers, a computer will pass the Turing Test by carrying on a conversation that is indistinguishable from a human’s.
You should also check out John Horgan's caustic comments on the whole singularity bit in a special IEEE spectrum feature, which ends with:
Let's face it. The singularity is a religious rather than a scientific vision. The science-fiction writer Ken MacLeod has dubbed it “the rapture for nerds,” an allusion to the end-time, when Jesus whisks the faithful to heaven and leaves us sinners behind.

Such yearning for transcendence, whether spiritual or technological, is all too understandable. Both as individuals and as a species, we face deadly serious problems, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, overpopulation, poverty, famine, environmental degradation, climate change, resource depletion, and AIDS. Engineers and scientists should be helping us face the world's problems and find solutions to them, rather than indulging in escapist, pseudoscientific fantasies like the singularity.

Monday, February 18, 2008

Need something to worry about? Climate tipping points...

This graphic is from an open access article in PNAS by Lenton et al. on tipping elements in the earth's climate system. You probably need to click on the graphic to make it larger; the color indicating the population densities is hard to see. In the same issue of PNAS, there is an article on how when it get warm (as in the Paleocene – Eocene Thermal Maximum caused by a carbon dioxide increase about 55 million years ago), the insects chow down on the plants.

Legend for graphic - Map of potential policy-relevant tipping elements in the climate system, overlain on global population density. Subsystems indicated could exhibit threshold-type behavior in response to anthropogenic climate forcing, where a small perturbation at a critical point qualitatively alters the future fate of the system. They could be triggered this century and would undergo a qualitative change within this millennium. We exclude from the map systems in which any threshold appears inaccessible this century (e.g., East Antarctic Ice Sheet) or the qualitative change would appear beyond this millennium (e.g., marine methane hydrates). Question marks indicate systems whose status as tipping elements is particularly uncertain.

Wednesday, November 21, 2007

Observing rat brains as they look to the future

An emerging view is that the hippocampus is essential to imagining the future as well as remembering the past (which makes a lot sense, since we usually base our imagined future on our past experience). Johnson and Redich have now observed ensembles of cells in the CA3 region of the rat hippocampus whose firing transiently encodes paths forward of an animal at decision points in a maze, as if they are reflecting on possible futures and deciding what to do next. The figure, from Heyman's review of the work in Science, illustrates that as a rat looks in one direction, neurons representing that position (inset) fire over a half-second period. Here is the abstract of the work:

Neural ensembles were recorded from the CA3 region of rats running on T-based decision tasks. Examination of neural representations of space at fast time scales revealed a transient but repeatable phenomenon as rats made a decision: the location reconstructed from the neural ensemble swept forward, first down one path and then the other. Estimated representations were coherent and preferentially swept ahead of the animal rather than behind the animal, implying it represented future possibilities rather than recently traveled paths. Similar phenomena occurred at other important decisions (such as in recovery from an error). Local field potentials from these sites contained pronounced theta and gamma frequencies, but no sharp wave frequencies. Forward-shifted spatial representations were influenced by task demands and experience. These data suggest that the hippocampus does not represent space as a passive computation, but rather that hippocampal spatial processing is an active process likely regulated by cognitive mechanisms.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Our optimism bias - brain correlates

Sharot et al. examine the tendency of most of us to imagine more optimistic outcomes than can be justified by sober appraisal. A moderate amount of optimistic illusion has been related to mental and physical health, and the general idea is that it is adaptive and useful because it motivates us towards future goals. Their abstract, and a figure showing the relevant brain regions:

Humans expect positive events in the future even when there is no evidence to support such expectations. For example, people expect to live longer and be healthier than average, they underestimate their likelihood of getting a divorce, and overestimate their prospects for success on the job market. We examined how the brain generates this pervasive optimism bias. Here we report that this tendency was related specifically to enhanced activation in the amygdala and in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex when imagining positive future events relative to negative ones, suggesting a key role for areas involved in monitoring emotional salience in mediating the optimism bias. These are the same regions that show irregularities in depression, which has been related to pessimism. Across individuals, activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex was correlated with trait optimism. The current study highlights how the brain may generate the tendency to engage in the projection of positive future events, suggesting that the effective integration and regulation of emotional and autobiographical information supports the projection of positive future events in healthy individuals, and is related to optimism.

The authors collected functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data while participants thought of autobiographical events related to a description of a life episode (for example, 'winning an award' or 'the end of a romantic relationship'). The word 'past' or 'future' indicated if they should think of an event that occurred in the past or one that might occur in the future. Trials were classified into positive, negative and neutral according to participants' ratings. They found that future positive events were rated as more positive than past positive events, and were imagined to be closer in temporal proximity then future negative events and all past events. (Click on image to enlarge it)

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

The prospective brain

I've been meaning to point you to a nice review article by Daniel Schacter and colleagues (PDF here). Here is the abstract and a summary figure.

A rapidly growing number of recent studies show that imagining the future depends on much of the same neural machinery that is needed for remembering the past. These findings have led to the concept of the prospective brain; an idea that a crucial function of the brain is to use stored information to imagine, simulate and predict possible future events. We suggest that processes such as memory can be productively re-conceptualized in light of this idea.

The core brain system that is consistently activated while remembering the past, envisioning the future and during related forms of mental simulation is illustrated schematically. Prominent components of this network include medial prefrontal regions, posterior regions in the medial and lateral parietal cortex (extending into the precuneus and the retrosplenial cortex), the lateral temporal cortex and the medial temporal lobe. Moreover, regions within this core brain system are functionally correlated with each other and, prominently, with the hippocampal formation. We suggest that this core brain system functions adaptively to integrate information about relationships and associations from past experiences, in order to construct mental simulations about possible future events.

Friday, September 28, 2007

Prospection: simulation of future unique to humans

Gilbert and Wilson offer a concise review of our unique human ability to simulate the future, covering brain regions involved and stereotyped errors that occur (PDF here). (I did a series of posts in June, 2006 abstracting Gilberts book "Stumbling on Happiness." You can use the blog search box to find them by entering the word "stumbling.") Here are some clips:


Prefeelings will be reliable predictors of subsequent hedonic experiences when two conditions are met. As the figure shows, when we are in the present (T1) attempting to predict our hedonic reaction to an event in the future (H2), our present hedonic experience (H1) is influenced by our simulation of the future event (e1) as well as by contextual factors (e1), such as the events that are occurring in the present, the thoughts we are having in the present, our present bodily states, and so on. We feel better when we imagine going to the theater than to the dentist, but we feel better imagining either event on a sunny day than on a rainy day, or when we are well rather than ill. Similarly, our future hedonic experience (H2) will be influenced both by our perception of the event (e2) and by contextual factors (e2). Because our hedonic experiences are influenced both by our mental representation of the event and by contextual factors, our present hedonic experience will be a reliable predictor of our future hedonic experience if and only if (i) our simulation of the event at T1 exerts the same influence on our hedonic experience at T1 as our perception of the event at T2 exerts on our hedonic experience at T2, and (ii) contextual factors at T1 exert the same influence on our hedonic experience at T1 as contextual factors at T2 exert on our hedonic experience at T2. In other words, H1 = H2 if and only if e1 = e2 and e1 = e2. Errors in prospection arise from the fact that people use their prefeelings to make hedonic predictions even when one or both of these conditions is not met. These errors are of four kinds.

Simulations are unrepresentative. We naturally imagine our next dental appointment by remembering our last one.... research suggests that people often use unrepresentative memories as a basis for simulation. For example, when people who have missed trains in the past are asked to imagine missing a train in the future, they tend to remember their worst train-missing experience rather than their typical train-missing experience.

Simulations are essentialized. When we imagine "going to the theater next week," we don't imagine every detail of the event, but rather, we imagine the essential features that define it. We imagine seeing a stage filled with actors but we do not imagine parking the car, checking our coat, or finding our seat. The problem with omitting inessential features from simulations is that such features can profoundly influence our subsequent hedonic experience... Because simulations omit inessential features, people tend to predict that good events will be better and bad events will be worse than they actually turn out to be. The young couple who simulate the joys of parenthood but fail to simulate the drudgery of diapers are unlikely to have the hedonic experience they imagined.

Simulations are abbreviated. If we imagined each and every moment of the events we were simulating, our simulations would take as long as the events themselves. Simulations are naturally abbreviated and represent just a few, select moments of a future event. The moments they select tend to be the early ones. When people imagine what their lives would be like if they won the lottery or became paraplegic, they are more likely to imagine the first day than the two-hundred-and-ninety-seventh. The problem with imagining only the early moments of an event is that hedonic reactions to events typically dissipate over time, which means that mental simulations tend to the moments that evoke the most intense pleasure or pain.

Simulations are decontextualized. Research shows that people often do not consider the potentially significant differences between contextual factors at T1 and T2 when using their present hedonic state to predict their future hedonic state. For example, hungry people mistakenly expect to like eating spaghetti for breakfast the next day, and sated people mistakenly expect to dislike eating it for dinner the next day. People who have just exercised mistakenly expect to enjoy drinking water the next day more than do people who are about to exercise (53). In both cases, people do not seem to realize that their present hunger and thirst are influencing their hedonic reactions to simulated future consumption. They ignore the fact that the contextual factors that are presently exerting an influence at T1 (i.e., hunger and thirst) will not exert the same influence at T2.
Their conclusion makes a nice summary of how modern and ancient brain systems interact in imagining possible future feelings:
Mental simulation is the means by which the brain discovers what it already knows. When faced with decisions about future events, the cortex generates simulations, briefly tricking subcortical systems into believing that those events are unfolding in the present and then taking note of the feelings these systems produce. The cortex is interested in feelings because they encode the wisdom that our species has acquired over millennia about the adaptive significance of the events we are perceiving. Alas, actually perceiving a bear is a potentially expensive way to learn about its adaptive significance, and thus evolution has provided us with a method for getting this information in advance of the encounter. When we preview the future and prefeel its consequences, we are soliciting advice from our ancestors.

This method is ingenious but imperfect. The cortex attempts to trick the rest of the brain by impersonating a sensory system. It simulates future events to find out what subcortical structures know, but try as it might, the cortex cannot generate simulations that have all the richness and reality of genuine perceptions. Its simulations are deficient because they are based on a small number of memories, they omit large numbers of features, they do not sustain themselves over time, and they lack context. Compared to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are mere cardboard cut-outs of reality. They are convincing enough to elicit brief hedonic reactions from subcortical systems, but because they differ from perceptions in such fundamental ways, the reactions they elicit may differ as well. Although prospection allows us to navigate time in a way that no other animal can, we still see more than we foresaw.

Thursday, September 20, 2007

Mind Over Manual

This is the title of an Op-Ed piece in the 9/13/2007 NY Times by Sally Satel which describes the difficulties and issues faced by the forthcoming revision (due in 2012) of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (PDF here). It faces issue such as the 40-fold jump in diagnosis of childhood bipolar disorder from 1994 to 2003. Some clips from the article:

We still don’t know how much of this increase represents long-overdue care of mentally ill youth and how much comes from facile labeling of youngsters who are merely irritable and moody...Part of the confusion stems from the lack of a discrete definition of juvenile bipolar illness in the diagnostic manual. But there is a deeper problem: despite the great progress being made in neuroscience, we still don’t have a clear picture of the brain mechanisms underlying bipolar illness — or most other mental illnesses... many patients meet several diagnostic definitions at once. Roughly half of adults with clinical depression, for example, also have symptoms that fit the definition of an anxiety disorder...the link between diagnosis and treatment is relatively weak. Antidepressants like Prozac help treat not only depression but also panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, bulimia and social phobia. This explains why clinicians often treat by symptom rather than diagnosis. Paranoia, for example, is treated with an antipsychotic drug whether it occurs in the context of schizophrenia, bipolar illness or methamphetamine use.

An updated manual..is unlikely to transform treatment substantially — after all, revising diagnoses is still just another way to describe mental conditions we don’t fully understand. But these refinements may well stimulate valuable new inquiry, enabling swifter progress in understanding the mechanisms of disease, better deployment of treatments we have and more efficient discovery of new ones.

Tuesday, April 10, 2007

Do animals experience past and future?

Carl Zimmer writes a nice piece in the 4/3 NYTimes on "Time in the Animal Mind" (PDF HERE).

Legend: Scrub jays, left, seem able to plan for the future in experiments, hiding today’s pine nuts for tomorrow’s breakfast. Squirrel monkeys also seem to think about future consequences, while hummingbirds seem to recall time and location of visits to flowers, and rats to remember where they encountered food in a maze. (Credits: from left, Adam Jones/Photo Researchers; Luke MacGregor/Reuters; Esteban Felix/Associated Press; Will & Deni McIntyre/Photo Researchers)

The animals shown in the figure have been shown to have impressive powers of memory, but this doesn't have to imply having a sense of memory or self, i.e. 'thinking about' past or future.

Some argue that mental time travel is distinctive to hominids. Humans can remember events long past and envision the future, and recent experiments by Schacter's lab at Harvard have shown that brain areas involved in episodic memory become active also when people think of themselves in the future.

What about animal's sense of the future? Can they plan ahead? Nicola, Univ. of Cambridge, has done interesting experiments showing sophisticated memory in scrub jays, and she

"recently tested her scrub jays for foresight. She and her colleagues put the birds in three adjoining compartments for six days. Each morning the birds were shut for two hours in one of two rooms. In one room they got nothing to eat. In the other room, they got powdered pine nuts (the scrub jays can eat the powder, but they cannot cache it). For the rest of the day, each bird could move around all three rooms and enjoy more powdered nuts.

On the seventh day, the scientists switched the powdered pine nuts with real ones. If the birds were so inclined, they could cache the pine nuts in ice cube trays the scientists put in the two morning rooms. “If I’m a bird, what I could do is take some of the provisions and hide it in there so that if I do wake up there in the morning, I can get my own breakfast,” Dr. Clayton said.

Dr. Clayton found that the birds put over three times more pine nuts in the no-breakfast room than in the breakfast room. She argues that the results mean that birds can take action for their future needs, knowing what they’ll need and where they’ll need it."
This and similar experiments in other animals may over the next few years provide more compelling evidence that animals do plan ahead, and thus take away yet another feature that many have thought distinctive to humans.

Friday, March 16, 2007

The End Of The 'Natural'

This stimulating essay by Andy Clark I pass on in its entirety:

I am optimistic that the human race will continue to find ways of enhancing its own modes of thought, reason, and feeling. As flexible adaptive agents we are wide open to a surprising variety of transformative bodily and mental tricks and ploys, ranging from the use of software, sports regimes and meditational practice, to drug therapies, gene therapies, and direct brain-machine interfaces.

I am optimistic that, stimulated by this explosion of transformative opportunities, we will soon come to regard our selves as constantly negotiable collection of resources, easily able to straddle and criss-cross the boundaries between biology and artifact. In this hybrid vision of our own humanity I see increased potentials not just for repair but for empowerment, expansion, recreation, and growth. For some, this very same hybrid vision may raise specters of coercion, monstering and subjugation. For clearly, not all change is for the better, and hybridization (however naturally it may come to us) is neutral rather than an intrinsic good. But there is cause for (cautious) optimism.

First, there is nothing new about human enhancement. Ever since the dawn of language and self-conscious thought, the human species has been engaged in a unique 'natural experiment' in progressive niche construction. We engineer our own learning environments so as to create artificial developmental cocoons that impact our acquired capacities of thought and reason. Those enhanced minds then design new cognitive niches that train new generations of minds, and so on, in an empowering spiral of co-evolving complexity. The result is that, as Herbert Simon is reputed to have said, 'most human intelligence is artificial intelligence anyway'. New and emerging technologies of human cognitive enhancement are just one more step along this ancient path.

Second, the biological brain is itself populated by a vast number of hidden 'zombie processes' that underpin the skills and capacities upon which successful behavior depends. There are, for example, a plethora of such unconscious processes involved in activities from grasping an object all the way to the flashes of insight that characterize much daily skilful problem-solving. Technology and drug based enhancements add, to that standard mix, still more processes whose basic operating principles are not available for conscious inspection and control. The patient using a brain-computer interface to control a wheelchair will not typically know just how it all works, or be able to reconfigure the interface or software at will. But in this respect too, the new equipment is simply on a par with much of the old.

Finally, empirical science is at last beginning systematically to address the sources and wellsprings of human happiness and human flourishing, and the findings of these studies must themselves be taken as important data points for the design and marketing of (putative) technologies of enhancement.

In sum, I am optimistic that we will soon see the end of those over-used, and mostly ad hoc, appeals to the 'natural'...

Friday, March 09, 2007

Ultimately, monopolies fail...

An essay by Barry Smith argues that attempts to dictate our tastes, our preference, our culture, our media, our political policies, or moral choices are bound in the end to fail because of the basic nature of our human cognition.

...Restless creatures that we are, we seek out variety and difference, opportunities to extend the scope of our thinking and to exercise discrimination and taste. This may make us hard to satisfy, but, ultimately, it is this lack of satisfaction that leads to progress and spells the end of hegemonies in ideology, religion, or science...I am optimistic that people who are fed a constant diet of the same ideas, the same foods, the same TV programmes, the same religious or political dogmas will eventually come to consider other possibilities...The lesson is already being learned in the corporate world where monopolies try to cope with this by diversifying their range of services. Their chance of survival will depend on how cynically or sincerely they respond to this restless aspect of the human mind.

Human cognition depends on change and movement in order to function. Evolution has built us this way. Try staring at a blank wall for several seconds without blinking and you will find the image eventually bleaching until you can see nothing. The eye’s visual workings respond to movement and change. So too do the other parts of our cognitive systems. Feed them the same inputs successively and they cease to produce very much worth having as output. Like the shark in water, we need to keep moving or, cognitively, we die.

...there is a paradox in our nature and our restless search for change. For unless we countenance change for change’s sake, or the relativist doctrine that anything goes (—and I don’t) how do we preserve the very best of our thinking, select better quality experiences, and maintain our purposes, directions and values? How do we avoid losing sight of older wisdom while rushing towards something new? It is here, perhaps, that our need for variation and discrimination serves us best. For the quick and gimmicky, the superficially appealing but weakest objects of our thinking or targets of desire will also be the least substantial and have an essential blandness that can tire us quickly. Besides, the more experience we have, the larger the background against which to compare and judge the worth or quality of what is newly encountered, and to decide if it will be ultimately rewarding. Certainly, people can be fickle or stubborn, but they are seldom fickle or stubborn for long. They will seek out better, according to what they are presently capable of responding to, and they will be dissatisfied by something not worthy of the attention they are capable of. For this reason attempts to dictate their tastes, cultural goods, ideologies or ideas are bound in the end to fail, and about that, and despite of many dark forces around us, I am optimistic.

Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Getting past "mind bugs"

From Mahzarin Banaji, Psychology Department at Harvard:

I am bullish about the mind's ability to unravel the beliefs contained within it—including beliefs about its own nature...the ability of humans everywhere to go against the grain of their own beliefs that are familiar, that feel natural and right, and that appear to be fundamentally true...

We've done this sort of unraveling many times before, whether it is about the relationship of the sun to the earth, or the relationship of other species to us. We've put aside what seemed natural, what felt right, and what came easily in favor of the opposite. I am optimistic that we are now ready to do the same with questions about the nature of our own minds. From the work of pioneers such as Herb Simon, Amos Tversky, and Danny Kahneman we know that the beliefs about our own minds that come naturally, feel right, and are easy to accept aren't necessarily true. That the bounds on rationality keep us from making decisions that are in our own interest, in the interest of those we love, in the long-term interest of our societies, even the planet, even perhaps the universe, with which we will surely have greater opportunity to interact in this century.

Here are some examples of what seems natural, feels right, and is easy to believe in—even though it isn't rational or true.

We irrationally anchor: ask people to generate their social security number and then the number of doctors in their city and the correlation between the two numbers will be significantly positive, when in fact it ought to be zero—there's no relation between the two variables. That's because we can't put the first one aside as we generate the second.

We irrationally endow: give somebody a cheap mug, and once it's "my mug" through ownership (and nothing else) it becomes, in our minds, a somewhat less cheap mug. Endowed with higher value, we are likely to demand a higher price for it than it is worth or is in our interest to demand.

We irrationally see patterns where non exist: Try to persuade a basketball player, fan, or statistician that there isn't anything to the idea of streak shooting; that chance is lumpy and that that's all there is to Michael Jordan's "hot hand".

...such "mind bugs" extend to the beliefs and preferences we have about ourselves, members of our own social groups, and those who sit farther away on a scale of social distance....We don't intend to discriminate or treat unfairly, but we do....The ability to think about one's own long range interest, to self-regulate and delay gratification, to consider the well-being of the collective, especially to view the collective as unbounded by religion, language, or nationality requires a mental leap that isn't natural or easy. And yet each new generation seems to be able to do it more successfully than the previous one...old beliefs come unraveled because such unraveling is in our self-interest...we unravel existing beliefs and preferences because we wish them to be in line with our intentions and aspirations and recognize that they are not. I see evidence of this everywhere—small acts to be the person one wishes to be rather than the person one is—and it is the constant attempt at this alignment that gives me optimism.

Monday, March 05, 2007

Jaron Lanier on transforming communication...

Some clips from his essay:

One extravagant idea is that the nature of communication itself might transform in the future as much as it did when language appeared.

Suppose you're enjoying an advanced future implementation of Virtual Reality and you can cause spontaneously designed things to appear and act and interact with the ease of sentences pouring forth during an ordinary conversation today.

Whether this is accomplished by measuring what your body does from the outside or by interacting via interior states of your brain is nothing more than an instrumentation question. Either way, we already have some clues about how the human organism might be able to improvise the content of a Virtual World.

That aspect of the brain which is optimized to control the many degrees of freedom of body motion is also well suited to controlling the many degrees of freedom of a superlative programming and design environment of the future.

Imagine a means of expression that is a cross between the three great new art forms of the 20th century: jazz improvisation, computer programming, and cinema. Suppose you could improvise anything that could be seen in a movie with the speed and facility of a jazz improviser.

A finite game is like a single game of baseball, with an end. An infinite game is like the overall phenomenon of baseball, which has no end. It is always a frontier.

So many utopian ideas are about Finite Games: End disease, solve global warming, get people to be more rational, reduce violence, and so on. As wonderful as all those achievements would (will!) be, there is something missing from them. Finite Game optimism suggests a circumscribed utopia, without frontier or mystery. The result isn't sufficiently inspiring for me- and apparently it doesn't quite grab the imaginations of a lot of other people who are endlessly fascinated by dubious religious and political utopias. The problem is heightened at the moment because there's a trope floating around in the sciences, probably unfounded, that we have already seen the outline of all the science we'll ever know, and we're just in the process of filling in the details.

The most valuable optimisms are Infinite Games, and imagining that new innovations as profound as language will come about in the future of human interaction is an example of one.

Thursday, March 01, 2007

Virtual Living - Is this scary, or what???

Here is a followup on a New York Times article by David Pogue on the Second Life phenomenon. I downloaded and tried the game, and soon fled in bored confusion (and fear). Because we can't hack it in real life, we are going to retreat to a virtual world?

From Pogue::

Second Life, as about 2 million people have already discovered, is a virtual world on the Internet. You're represented by a computer-generated character (an avatar) that can walk around, fly, teleport, or exchange typed comments with other people's characters. You can make yourself young and beautiful, equip yourself with fancy clothes, build a dream house by the water, or make the sun set on command. The average member spends four hours a day in Second Life.

One thing that makes Second Life different from other online 3-D games is its economy. People make stuff and sell it to each other: clothes, rockets, cars, new hairstyles. Second Life itself is free, but members nonetheless pay real money-$220 million a year-to buy these imaginary accessories.

From Pogue's interview with Phillip Rosedale, the CEO of Linden Lab, the company behind Second Life:

DP: Is there any worry about the whole isolation thing? First iPod earbuds, and now people substituting virtual interactions for real ones?

PR: Well I'll tell ya, the history of technology has, in the past 50 years, been to increasingly isolate us. We've gone from watching movies in a movie theater, to watching them as a family at home, to watching them alone on our iPod.

But actually I think there's a next wave of technology, of which Second Life is certainly a great example, where we are bringing people back together again into the same place to have these experiences.

The thing about Second Life that is so fascinating and different is not just that it's 3-D. There are always people to share that experience with, or to ask for help. Or to laugh at something with. And that experience is an innately human one that technology has deprived us of. I think many people use Second Llife to have more friends, and more human contact, than they do in the real world.

DP: What's the hard part for the next phase?

PR: Well, we need to grow Second Life as fast as people want it to grow. And right now, that seems to be awfully fast. If you look at the number of people online at one time, that number has doubled in the last 90 days. Right now, the challenge is just scaling up the services, and the computers, and even the policies, and customer support.

Looking farther out, we have to really open it up so that a lot of people can work on it with us. [Linden Lab recently "open-sourced" the code of the Second Life program, in hopes that volunteers worldwide will comb through it for improvements.]

When you look at Second Life today, you may say, "I don't like the graphics." Or, you know, "It's clunky. It runs too slow." But you have to bear in mind that in just a few years, this is gonna look like walking into a movie screen. And that's just gonna be such an amazing thing.

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Breakdown can be a positive development.

Michael Wolff, columnist for Vanity Fair, offers this paragraph on the joys of failing enterprises:

"The good news where I come from, as a prisoner here in the American media business, is all about entropy. The massive and ridiculous systems that we've built to control and market expression and culture, with their dissipations of so many people's energy, are deteriorating and coming apart. Everyday the media—a much more vexing monolith than religion and God—takes another transforming step from consolidation and uniformity toward uncertainty and chaos. This is not just because new technologies are revolutionizing production and distribution—though that's no small part of this creative destruction—but as much because of the inevitable disorder and randomness of closed systems. What's optimistic is that so many strategists and consultants and bureaucrats and moguls have not been able to maintain control and have been shown to be as clueless as everybody else (this is true, come to think of it, not just at Time Warner and Viacom, but at the Pentagon). Breakdown can be a positive development."

Monday, February 26, 2007

Planning for the future is not uniquely human, Scrub Jays do it!

It is commonly believed that planning for the future is a skill unique to humans. Raby and colleagues now present experiments with western scrub-jays that show that these birds plan for the future by preferentially caching food where it will be needed most.

From the Editor's summary: "There is much debate as to whether animals can travel mentally in time, to plan for the future in anticipation of an expected need. It is difficult to prove that an animal's actions are a result of such time-shifting but work on a bird, the western scrub-jay, seems to have done exactly that. The two protocols, the 'planning for breakfast' and 'breakfast choice' experiments, show that jays can provide for a future need, both by preferentially caching food in a place in which they have learned that they will be hungry the next morning, and by differentially storing a particular food in a place where it will not be available next day. The results suggest that the birds spontaneously plan for tomorrow without reference to their current motivational state."

Future discoveries: illusions of order versus stochastic science.

Nassim Taleb on future discoveries: "...we are victims of the narrative fallacy — even in scientific research ...The pattern-seeking, causality producing machine in us blinds us with illusions of order... I hold that not only discoveries are also largely the result of a random process, but that their randomness is even less tractable than, and not as simple as, biological evolution....this makes me extremely optimistic about the future in several selective research-oriented domains, those in which there is an asymmetry in outcomes favoring the positive over the negative — like evolution. These domains thrive on randomness. The higher the uncertainty in such environments, the rosier the future — since we only select what works and discard the rest.

I am convinced that the future of America is rosier than people claim — I've been hearing about its imminent decline ever since I started reading. Take the following puzzle. Whenever you hear or read a snotty European presenting his stereotypes about Americans, he will often describe them as "uncultured", "unintellectual" and "poor in math" because, unlike his peers, they are not into equation drills and the constructions middlebrows people call "high culture". Yet the person making these statements will be likely to be addicted to his Ipod, wearing t-shirts and blue jeans, and using Microsoft Word to jot down his "cultural" statements on his (Intel) PC, with some Google searches on the Internet here and there interrupting his composition. Well, it so happened that the U.S. is currently far, far more tinkering an environment than that of these nations of museum goers and equation solvers — in spite of the perceived weakness of the educational system - which allows the bottom-up uncertainty-driven trial-and-error system to govern it, whether in technology or in business....it produces "doers", Black Swan hunting, dream-chasing entrepreneurs, or others with a tolerance for risk-taking which attracts aggressive tinkering foreigners. And globalization allowed the U.S. to specialize in the creative aspect of things, the risk-taking production of concepts and ideas... by exporting jobs, separate the less scalable and more linear components and assign them to someone in more mathematical and "cultural" states happy to be paid by the hour and work on other people's ideas.

All the while institutional science is largely driven by causal certainties, or the illusion of the ability to grasp these certainties; stochastic tinkering does not have easy acceptance. Yet we are increasingly learning to practice it without knowing — thanks to overconfident entrepreneurs, naive investors, greedy investment bankers, and aggressive venture capitalists brought together by the free-market system. I am also optimistic that the academy is losing its power and ability to put knowledge in straightjackets and more out-of-the-box knowledge will be generated Wiki-style."

Friday, February 23, 2007

Social Networks - the twenty-first century science?


Duncan Watts suggests (Nature 445, 489; 1 February 2007) that "If handled appropriately, data about Internet-based communication and interactivity could revolutionize our understanding of collective human behaviour."

The social sciences "have been much less successful than the physical and life sciences in producing a coherent theoretical framework that can account for their discoveries. This is not because social scientists are less clever than their peers in other fields, but because social phenomena are among the hardest scientific problems to solve."

"For the past 50 years or so, sociologists have thought deeply about the importance of interactions between people, institutions and markets in determining collective social behaviour. They have even built a language — network analysis — to describe these interactions in quantitative terms. But the objects of analysis, such as friendship ties, are hard to observe, especially for large numbers of people over extended periods of time. As a result, network data have historically comprised one-time snapshots, often for quite small groups. And most studies have relied on self-reports from participants, which suffer from cognitive biases, errors of perception and framing ambiguities."

"The striking proliferation over the past decade of Internet-based communication and interactivity, however, is beginning to lift these constraints. For the first time, we can begin to observe the real-time interactions of millions of people at a resolution that is sensitive to effects at the level of the individual. Meanwhile, ever-faster computers permit us to simulate large networks of social interactions. The result has been tremendous interest in social networks: thousands of papers and a growing number of books have been published in less than a decade, leading some to herald the arrival of a 'science of networks'."

Thursday, February 22, 2007

Steven Kosslyn on increasing human intelligence:

I think this brief essay is worth reproducing here:

"I am optimistic that human intelligence can be increased, and can be increased dramatically in the near future. I see three avenues that will lead to this end.

First, the fruits of cognitive neuroscience and related fields have identified a host of distinct neural systems in the human brain. Different combinations of these systems are used in the service of accomplishing different tasks, and each system can be made more efficient by "targeted training." Such training involves having people perform tasks that are designed to exercise very specific abilities, which grow out of distinct neural networks. Just as a body builder can do curls to build up biceps and dips on parallel bars to build up triceps, we can design computer-game-like tasks that exercise specific parts of the brain—mental muscles, if you will. By exercising the right sets of systems, specific types of reasoning not only can be improved but—the holy grail of training studies—such improvement can generalize to new tasks that draw on those systems.

Second, people often grapple with problems in groups, be they formally designated teams or casual huddles around the water cooler. I am optimistic that understanding the nature of such group interactions will increase human intelligence. Just as a mechanical calculator can extend our mental capacities, other people help us extend our intelligence—both in a cognitive sense (as required to solve problems) and in an emotional sense (as required to detect and respond appropriately to emotions, ours and those of others). In this sense, other people can serve as "social prosthetic systems," as extensions of our own brains; a wooden leg can fill in for a missing limb, and others' brains can fill in for our cognitive and emotional limitations. To the extent that researchers come to understand how such social prosthetic systems arise and operate, they will understand how to increase human intelligence.

Third, the line between animate and inanimate information processing is becoming increasingly blurry as research in multiple fields proceeds apace. I expect that engineers will continue to press forward, designing increasingly powerful machines to help us extend our intelligence. For example, some people carry computers with them everywhere they go, and treat Google as an extension of their own knowledge bases. Or, in my case, my PDA extends my organizational ability enormously. We soon will have a wide variety of mechanical helpmates. The distinction between what goes on in the head and what relies on external devices is becoming more subtle and nuanced, and in so doing human intelligence is being extended.

Crucially, each of these three developments amplifies the effects of the others, producing synergies: As "brain exercises" enhance our personal intellectual abilities, we can learn how to make better use of mechanical aids and how to rely more effectively on other people. The confluence of all three types of developments will produce positive feedback loops, where the very act of interacting with others or working with smart devices will help us continue to develop our brains, and as our brains develop we will in turn be able to use increasingly sophisticated devices and rely on people in more complex and powerful ways.

With luck, such developments will produce news sorts of extended social links and highly integrated social networks, and a new kind of "smart society" will emerge. And, who knows, such a society may not only be smarter, but also wiser."

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Human Nature Redux

David Broder writes an Op-Ed piece with this title in the 2/18/07 Sunday NY Times, noting how public consciousness has shifted away from a belief in the essential goodness of human nature. "As Steven Pinker has put it, Hobbes was more right than Rousseau.....human beings are not as pliable as the social engineers imagined. Human beings operate according to preset epigenetic rules, which dispose people to act in certain ways. We strive for dominance and undermine radical egalitarian dreams. We’re tribal and divide the world into in-groups and out-groups...This darker if more realistic view of human nature has led to a rediscovery of different moral codes and different political assumptions. Most people today share what Thomas Sowell calls the Constrained Vision, what Pinker calls the Tragic Vision and what E. O. Wilson calls Existential Conservatism. This is based on the idea that there is a universal human nature; that it has nasty, competitive elements; that we don’t understand much about it; and that the conventions and institutions that have evolved to keep us from slitting each other’s throats are valuable and are altered at great peril."

" Today, parents don’t seek to liberate their children; they supervise, coach and instruct every element of their lives. Today, there really is no antinomian counterculture — even the artists and rock stars are bourgeois strivers. Today, communes and utopian schemes are out of favor. People are mostly skeptical of social engineering efforts and jaundiced about revolutionaries who promise to herald a new dawn. Iraq has revealed what human beings do without a strong order-imposing state....This is a big pivot in intellectual history. The thinkers most associated with the Tragic Vision are Isaiah Berlin, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Friedrich Hayek and Hobbes. Many of them are conservative...And here’s another perversity of human nature. Many conservatives resist the theory of evolution even though it confirms many of conservatism’s deepest truths."