Watching yourself during a brain stroke...

This widely circulating video has some fascinating insights into the experience of having a stroke. Jill Bolte Taylor gives an very simplified description of left versus right hemisphere function and then describes the consequences of a hemmorage in her left hemisphere that formed a large clot pressing against the language area. She watched a flickering back and forth between having a self with thoughts and a la-la land or nirvana of pure awareness as she gradually lost motor and sensory control :

Our innate number sense.

Jim Holt has written an excellent article in the New Yorker focusing on the work of Stanislas Dehaene, who argues that humans (and higher animals) have an inbuilt “number sense” capable of some basic calculations and estimates. Evidence from cognitive deficits in brain-damaged patients has shown that we have a sense of number that is independent of language, memory, and reasoning in general.
When we see numerals or hear number words, our brains appear to automatically map them onto a number line that grows increasingly fuzzy above 3 or 4. A few chunks from Holt's article:

... it is generally agreed that infants come equipped with a rudimentary ability to perceive and represent number. (The same appears to be true for many kinds of animals, including salamanders, pigeons, raccoons, dolphins, parrots, and monkeys.) And if evolution has equipped us with one way of representing number, embodied in the primitive number sense, culture furnishes two more: numerals and number words. These three modes of thinking about number, Dehaene believes, correspond to distinct areas of the brain. The number sense is lodged in the parietal lobe, the part of the brain that relates to space and location; numerals are dealt with by the visual areas; and number words are processed by the language areas.

Dehaene has been able to bring together the experimental and the theoretical sides of his quest, and, on at least one occasion, he has even theorized the existence of a neurological feature whose presence was later confirmed by other researchers. In the early nineteen-nineties, working with Jean-Pierre Changeux, he set out to create a computer model to simulate the way humans and some animals estimate at a glance the number of objects in their environment. In the case of very small numbers, this estimate can be made with almost perfect accuracy, an ability known as “subitizing” (from the Latin word subitus, meaning “sudden”). Some psychologists think that subitizing is merely rapid, unconscious counting, but others, Dehaene included, believe that our minds perceive up to three or four objects all at once, without having to mentally “spotlight” them one by one. Getting the computer model to subitize the way humans and animals did was possible, he found, only if he built in “number neurons” tuned to fire with maximum intensity in response to a specific number of objects. His model had, for example, a special four neuron that got particularly excited when the computer was presented with four objects. The model’s number neurons were pure theory, but almost a decade later two teams of researchers discovered what seemed to be the real item, in the brains of macaque monkeys that had been trained to do number tasks. The number neurons fired precisely the way Dehaene’s model predicted—a vindication of theoretical psychology. “Basically, we can derive the behavioral properties of these neurons from first principles,” he told me. “Psychology has become a little more like physics.”

Consciousness papers for January

Most downloaded in January 2008 from the ASSC archives:

1. Koriat, A. (2006) Metacognition and Consciousness. In: Cambridge handbook
of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA. 1359 downloads
from 27 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/175/
2. Sagiv, Noam and Ward, Jamie (2006) Crossmodal interactions: lessons from
synesthesia. In: Visual Perception, Part 2. Progress in Brain Research,
Volume 155. 925 downloads from 19 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/224/
3. Robbins, Stephen E (2007) Time, Form and the Limits of Qualia. Journal of
Mind and Behavior, 28 (1). pp. 19-43. 760 downloads from 14 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/333/
4. Gomes, Gilberto (2005) Is consciousness epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan
Pockett. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (12). pp. 77-79. 739 downloads
from 12 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/160/
5. Seth, A.K. and Baars, B.J. (2005) Neural Darwinism and Consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition, 14. pp. 140-168. 644 downloads from 18
countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/163/

Nicholas Humphrey on consciousness...

I have always admired Nicholas Humphrey's perspectives on sensing and consciousness, and referenced his ideas on evolution of the nervous system in my Biology of Mind book. He has now written a nice essay in Seed Magazine, and I strongly recommend that you read it. He argues against the idea:

...that consciousness must be helping us do something that we can do only by virtue of being conscious, in the way that, say, a bird can fly only because it has wings, or you can understand this sentence only because you know English.

Rather,

...I want to suggest the role of phenomenal consciousness may not be like this at all. Its role may not be to enable us to do something we could not do otherwise, but rather to encourage us to do something we would not do otherwise: to make us take an interest in things that otherwise would not interest us, or to mind things we otherwise would not mind, or to set ourselves goals we otherwise would not set.

I will not hold back from telling you my own main conclusion from a lifetime's interest in what consciousness does. I may shock you by what may seem the naivety of my conclusion (I've shocked myself): I think the plain and simple fact is that consciousness—on various levels—makes life more worth living.

We like being phenomenally conscious. We like the world in which we're phenomenally conscious. We like ourselves for being phenomenally conscious. And the resulting joie de vivre, the enchantment with the world we live in, and the enhanced sense of our own metaphysical importance have, in the course of evolutionary history, turned our lives around.

Added note 11/16/08: I just found a later published version of this article. PDF here.

There are No Moral Facts - Metzinger

Here is a brief essay from one of my heroes, Thomas Metzinger, that I completely agree with - spiced up by an unrelated and gratuitous graphic on morality.

I have become convinced that it would be of fundamental importance to know what a good state of consciousness is. Are there forms of subjective experience which — in a strictly normative sense — are better than others? Or worse? What states of consciousness should be illegal? What states of consciousness do we want to foster and cultivate and integrate into our societies? What states of consciousness can we force upon animals — for instance, in consciousness research itself? What states of consciousness do we want to show our children? And what state of consciousness do we eventually die in ourselves?

2007 has seen the rise of an important new discipline: "neuroethics". This is not simply a new branch of applied ethics for neuroscience — it raises deeper issues about selfhood, society and the image of man. Neuroscience is now quickly transformed into neurotechnology. I predict that parts of neurotechnology will turn into consciousness technology. In 2002, out-of-body experiences were, for the first time, induced with an electrode in the brain of an epileptic patient. In 2007 we saw the first two studies, published in Science, demonstrating how the conscious self can be transposed to a location outside of the physical body as experienced, non-invasively and in healthy subjects. Cognitive enhancers are on the rise. The conscious experience of will has been experimentally constructed and manipulated in a number of ways. Acute episodes of depression can be caused by direct interventions in the brain, and they have also been successfully blocked in previously treatment-resistant patients. And so on.

Whenever we understand the specific neural dynamics underlying a specific form of conscious content, we can in principle delete, amplify or modulate this content in our minds. So shouldn’t we have a new ethics of consciousness — one that does not ask what a good action is, but that goes directly to the heart of the matter, asks what we want to do with all this new knowledge and what the moral value of states of subjective experience is?

Here is where I have changed my mind. There are no moral facts. Moral sentences have no truth-values. The world itself is silent, it just doesn’t speak to us in normative affairs — nothing in the physical universe tells us what makes an action a good action or a specific brain-state a desirable one. Sure, we all would like to know what a good neurophenomenological configuration really is, and how we should optimize our conscious minds in the future. But it looks like, in a more rigorous and serious sense, there is just no ethical knowledge to be had. We are alone. And if that is true, all we have to go by are the contingent moral intuitions evolution has hard-wired into our emotional self-model. If we choose to simply go by what feels good, then our future is easy to predict: It will be primitive hedonism and organized religion.

Most popular consciousness articles for November

From the monthly report of downloads from the eprint archives of the Assoc. for the Study of Consciousness:

1. Sagiv, Noam and Ward, Jamie (2006) Crossmodal interactions: lessons from
synesthesia. In: Visual Perception, Part 2. Progress in Brain Research,
Volume 155. 1404 downloads from 17 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/224/
2. David, Elodie and Laloyaux, Cédric and Devue, Christel and Cleeremans,
Axel (2007) Change blindness to gradual changes in facial expressions.
Psychologica Belgica, in press. 1299 downloads from 12 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/256/
3. Koriat, A. (2006) Metacognition and Consciousness. In: Cambridge handbook
of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA. 1088 downloads
from 21 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/175/
4. Mashour, George A. (2007) Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the
Hard Problem of Unconsciousness. In: 11th Annual Meeting of the ASSC, Las
Vegas. 976 downloads from 18 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/294/
5. Rosenthal, David (2007) Consciousness and its function. In: 11th annual
meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 22-25
June 2007, Las Vegas, USA. 971 downloads from 19 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/293/

Most popular consciousness articles...

For October 2007, from the ASSC archives (from which 49638 papers were downloaded from 69 countries!).

1. Rosenthal, David (2007) Consciousness and its function. In: 11th annual
meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 22-25
June 2007, Las Vegas, USA.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/293/
2. Koriat, A. (2006) Metacognition and Consciousness. In: Cambridge handbook
of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/175/
3. Sagiv, Noam and Ward, Jamie (2006) Crossmodal interactions: lessons from
synesthesia. In: Visual Perception, Part 2. Progress in Brain Research,
Volume 155.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/224/
4. Gennaro, Rocco J. (2007) Visual Agnosia and Higher-Order Thought Theory.
In: 11th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of
Consciousness, 22-25 Jun 2007, Las Vegas, USA. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/310/
5. Mashour, George A. (2007) Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the
Hard Problem of Unconsciousness. In: 11th Annual Meeting of the ASSC, Las
Vegas. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/294/

A Ramachandran lecture...

In this excellent and engaging talk, Vilayanur Ramachandran discusses how brain damage can reveal the connection between internal structures of the brain and corresponding functions of the mind. Focus is on phantom limb pain, synesthesia (when people hear color or smell sounds), and the Capgras delusion (when brain-damaged people believe their closest friends and family have been replaced with imposters.)

Another window into the minds of chimps and humans

Rilling et al. compare resting-state brain activity in humans and chimpanzees:

In humans, the wakeful resting condition is characterized by a default mode of brain function involving high levels of activity within a functionally connected network of brain regions. This network has recently been implicated in mental self-projection into the past, the future, or another individual's perspective. Here we use [18F]-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography imaging to assess resting-state brain activity in our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, as a potential window onto their mental world and compare these results with those of a human sample. We find that, like humans, chimpanzees show high levels of activity within default mode areas, including medial prefrontal and medial parietal cortex. Chimpanzees differ from our human sample in showing higher levels of activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and lower levels of activity in left-sided cortical areas involved in language and conceptual processing in humans. Our results raise the possibility that the resting state of chimpanzees involves emotionally laden episodic memory retrieval and some level of mental self-projection, albeit in the absence of language and conceptual processing.

A Consciousness Debate

Christof Koch and Susan Greenfield offer a written version of their Oxford University Debate in the summer of 2006 in the Oct. 2007 issue of Scientific American. While they make a point of contrasting their models of the neuronal correlates of consciousness, I think a blending of the two may most closely approach the real situation.

What happens in your brain when you see a dog, hear a voice, suddenly feel sad or have any other subjective experience?

KOCH'S MODEL
A coalition of pyramidal neurons linking the back and front of the cortex fires in a unique way. Different coalitions activate to represent different stimuli from the senses (left). In a mouse cortex (right) these pyramidal cells (green) lie in brain layer 5, surrounded by nonneuronal cells (blue).


GREENFIELD'S MODEL
Neurons across the brain fire in synchrony (green) and prevail until a second stimulus prompts a different assembly to arise (orange). Various assemblies coalesce and disband moment to moment, while incorporating feedback from the body. In a rat brain (bottom), an assembly in the cortex forms (a, b), peaks (c), then decays (d) within 0.35 second after the thalamus is electrically stimulated.

Christof Koch is professor of cognitive and behavioral biology at the California Institute of Technology, where he teaches and has conducted research on the neuronal basis of visual attention and consciousness for more than two decades.

Susan Greenfield is professor of pharmacology at the University of Oxford, director of the Royal Institution of Great Britain and member of the British Parliament's House of Lords. Her research focuses on novel brain mechanisms, including those underlying neurodegenerative diseases.

A new consiousness and philosophy of mind bibliography

David Chalmers and David Bourget are offering a more extensive online service, outlined in this message from ASSC (Assoc. for Sci.Stud. Cons.):

We are pleased to announce the launch of MindPapers, a new website
with a bibliography covering around 18000 published papers and online
papers in the philosophy of mind and the science of consciousness.
This site grew out of a combination of David Chalmers' bibliography in
philosophy of mind and his page of online papers on consciousness, but
it is much larger and has many new capacities, programmed by David
Bourget. The site address is:

http://consc.net/mindpapers/

There is also a separate front end for "Online Papers on
Consciousness". Where MindPapers now combines both offline published
papers and online papers from free and commercial sites, Online Papers
on Consciousness is devoted to free online papers (currently around
4700). It is based on the same database as MindPapers, but is
organized in a way to emphasize issues concerning consciousness and
cognitive science rather than the philosophy of mind. The address is

http://consc.net/online/

The MindPapers database contains 2773 papers on the philosophy of
consciousness (under 59 topics and subtopics) and 3917 papers on the
science of consciousness (under 71 topics and subtopics), as well as
thousands of papers on such related topics as perception,
intentionality, the philosophy of AI, and the philosophy of cognitive
science.

Capacities include (i) links and citation information throughout, (ii)
flexible navigation, display, and search options, (iii) the ability to
submit and edit entries, (iv) the capacity for automated off-campus
proxy access to commercial sites, and (v) a wealth of statistical
information.

We encourage everyone to try these sites to submit any relevant
material that we are missing (for a start, try searching on your own
name). There are tools on the site for submitting entries, as well as
for correcting entries and notifying us of any bugs and suggestions.

--David Chalmers and David Bourget
chalmers@anu.edu.au; david.bourget@anu.edu.au

Silent Minds

I want to point you to an excellent article by Jerome Groopman, with the title of this post, that appeared in a recent New Yorker Magazine. It describes recent work showing that brain imaging of some vegetative patients reveals responses to faces, and other visual and auditory inputs, that are indistinguishable from those of normal subjects (note: there are approximately 35,000 Americans in a vegetative state and another 280,000 in a minimally conscious state). Responses during various mental tasks, such as resolving ambiguous sentences or imagining playing a tennis game, can also be normal. This shows that an assumption held by doctors for decades - that vegetative patients lack capacity for conscious thought - is incorrect. Other vegetative patients (such as Terri Schiavo), in contrast, can show almost no cortical activity.

This all suggests a better medical definition of consciousness is required - such as the ability to report to ourselves or others the content of the representations in our brains, to sustain these representations over time and broadcast them broadly within the brain.

The Outsourced Brain

I can't resist passing on this clever NY Times Op-Ed piece by David Brooks - on the subject of the dissolution of our individual intelligences into the mush of the infosphere.

Different takes on the social brain.

Gobbini et al. show that different types of mentalizing engage different brain regions. The abstract and a summary figure:

We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing—false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions—to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)—components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)—the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)—components of the distributed neural system for action understanding—and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form.

Figure - Locations of loci of activations associated with ToM, social animation, and biological motion tasks, projected onto the left and right lateral surfaces of the brain.

Most popular consciousness papers for September 2007

From the ASSC Eprints Archive:

1. Rosenthal, David (2007) Consciousness and its function. In: 11th annual
meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 22-25
June 2007, Las Vegas, USA. 1014 downloads from 20 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/293/
2. Koriat, A. (2006) Metacognition and Consciousness. In: Cambridge handbook
of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA. 870 downloads
from 18 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/175/
3. Windt, Jennifer Michelle and Metzinger, Thomas (2006) The philosophy of
dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject
during the dream state? In: The new science of dreaming. 834 downloads from
16 countries. http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/200/
4. Sagiv, Noam and Ward, Jamie (2006) Crossmodal interactions: lessons from
synesthesia. In: Visual Perception, Part 2. Progress in Brain Research,
Volume 155. 814 downloads from 14 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/224/
5. Droege, Paula (2007) ASSC-11 Conference Report. In: 11th annual meeting
of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, June 22-25,
2007, Las Vegas, Nevada. 798 downloads from 18 countries.
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/323/

Baboon Metaphysics

Nicholas Wade comments (PDF here) on the work of Cheney and Seyfarth, whose most recent book has the title of this post. They have carried out an ingenious series of experiments in the wild to probe how the baboon's mind keeps track of transient relationships:

Royal is a cantankerous old male baboon whose troop of some 80 members lives in the Moremi Game Reserve in Botswana. A perplexing event is about to disturb his day....From the bushes to his right, he hears a staccato whoop, the distinctive call that female baboons always make after mating. He recognizes the voice as that of Jackalberry, the current consort of Cassius, a male who outranks Royal in the strict hierarchy of male baboons. No hope of sex today....But then, surprisingly, he hears Cassius’s signature greeting grunt to his left. His puzzlement is plain on the video made of his reaction. You can almost see the wheels turn slowly in his head:...“Jackalberry here, but Cassius over there. Hmm, Jackalberry must be hooking up with some one else. But that means Cassius has left her unguarded. Say what — this is my big chance!”...The video shows him loping off in the direction of Jackalberry’s whoop. But all that he will find is the loudspeaker from which researchers have played Jackalberry’s recorded call.

Although Baboons excel at the skills required for maintaining social networks regulated by matrilineal lines and dominance hierarchies, there is no evidence that they attribute beliefs or ideas to other animals, or that 'they know that they know.' They provide an example of what sort of social and cognitive complexity is possible in the absence of language and a theory of mind.

A neural marker of consciousness

Here is the author's summary of an interesting article by Del Cul et al. in PlosBiology.

Understanding the neural mechanisms that distinguish between conscious and nonconscious processes is a crucial issue in cognitive neuroscience. In this study, we focused on the transition that causes a visual stimulus to cross the threshold to consciousness, i.e., visibility. We used a backward masking paradigm in which the visibility of a briefly presented stimulus (the “target”) is reduced by a second stimulus (the “mask”) presented shortly after this first stimulus. (Human participants report the visibility of the target.) When the delay between target and mask stimuli exceeds a threshold value, the masked stimulus becomes visible. Below this threshold, it remains nonvisible. During the task, we recorded electric brain activity from the scalp and reconstructed the cortical sources corresponding to this activity. Conscious perception of masked stimuli corresponded to activity in a broadly distributed fronto-parieto-temporal network, occurring from about 300 ms after stimulus presentation. We conclude that this late stage, which could be clearly separated from earlier neural events associated with subliminal processing and mask-target interactions, can be regarded as a marker of consciousness.


Figure: Top, depth of cortical processing: subliminal stimuli (left panel) should evoke a strong activation in extrastriate visual cortex, but their intensity should quickly decrease in higher visual areas; only conscious stimuli (right panel) should trigger a late surge of activation in a global prefronto-parietal network. Bottom, schematic time course of activation as a function of masking strength. Masking is expected to have little effect on early visual activation but to modulate the strength of activation in higher visual areas. Furthermore, there should be a nonlinear effect of masking strength in prefrontal cortex, with a similar late top-down activation peak occurring simultaneously in visual areas

Non-materialist neuroscience

Here is an discussion on what the authors call the latest installment of the war on science. From their introduction:

Non-materialist neuroscience is the latest front in the war on science. The battle has been a long time coming and it is surprising it has taken so long to get going. Modern neuroscience is rapidly reducing much of human thought, emotion and behavior into component pieces of neuronal interactions. The combination of computational modeling and non-invasive imaging of living brains has allowed researchers to begin describing how complex thought emerges from the firing patterns of neurons. In a way neuroscience is the death knell of dualism. When materialist causes become both necessary and sufficient to explain all of human thought then parsimony dictates that references to a soul or other supernatural entities can be tossed out.

Non-materialist neuroscience is a reaction to these discoveries, a rallying cry for dualism. Like creationism and intelligent design this "new" neuroscience is a reactionary movement against science. Rather than a hypothesis that leads to predictions and experiments, it is simply a catalog of things modern neuroscience supposedly cannot yet explain.

Unsurprisingly, the movement is spear-headed by intelligent design lackeys from the Discovery Institute and related affiliates. The primary proponents of the movement are Michael Egnor, a neurosurgeon and recent contributor to the Discovery Institute blog, Denyse O'Leary a Canadian "journalist" who runs her own blog dedicated to non-materialist neuroscience and likes to copy and paste these entries over on William Dembski's blog as well, and Mario Beauregard the author with O'Leary of a recent book on the subject of non-materialist neuroscience The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist's Case for the Existence of the Soul.

Some rambling on "Selves" and "Purpose"

The recent posts on Alwyn Scott and the Blakesless' book prompt me to this random walk....

Self conscious "Purpose" of the sort we humans experience, in the service of crafting new political movements or environments, is an evolved psychology that (sometimes) helps pass on our genes, and requires our distinctively human self reflective "I". Our behavior and that of other animals also reflects a kind of purpose that has been formed by our evolutionary and developmental history. In other animals such behaviors are acted out on the cusp of an eternal present - there is no evidence that they "know that they know" in the way that we can.

Both modern neuroscience (cf. the quote from the Blakesless' book) and Buddhist psychology inform us that the self and the purpose that each of us experiences is an illusion or confabulation of our brains - hopefully a useful one - whose utility is tested by how it enhances our energy and individual survival. This 'illusion' is a powerful instrument of downward causation, regulating our psychological, immune, neuro-endocrine robustness.

What is especially amazing is that our human body/brain can sometimes use meditative or other techniques to bootstrap to a level of metacognition that rests antecedent to - and can be the detached observer of - the generation of this illusion of a self and its purposes.

The maximum power of our self illusion, for most of us, goes with our heartfelt immersion and belief in it (i.e., our delusion). From such a immersion, it can be more difficult to discern or appreciate the different selves and purposes of other humans, and their cultures and historical eras.

Stairways to the Mind

Alwyn Scott passed away recently. "Stairways to the Mind" was one of his books, on levels of organization and emergent properties. I knew him when he was at Wisconsin, and later read a copy of this book in draft form, to offer comments. In looking back over his work, I came across a review of the book written by Willis Harman, one of the founders of the Noetic Sciences Institute, which included a mild criticism that I don't completely agree with, but thought interesting:

Having gone so far in urging the usefulness of a hierarchical structuring of science, and having recognized (with Roger Sperry) that the consciousness level can be causal with regard to the biological or physical level (as well as the reverse), it seems a pity not to have gone one step further to recognize that the new disciplines of transpersonal psychology and anthropology, and the deepest insights of artists and mystics, can fit quite comfortably within the top level of the hierarchy. The metaphysical insight that the material world evolves within consciousness can live side by side with the complementary metaphor of consciousness as emergent from the physical.